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FOREIGN CITIZENS IN TRANSNATIONAL CLASS ACTIONS
Linda Sandstrom Simardt &Jay Tidmarshtt
This Article addresses an increasingly important question: When, if
ever, should foreign citizens be included as members of an American class
action? The existing consensus holds that courts should exclude from class
membership those foreign citizens whose country does not recognize an Ameri-
can class judgment. Our analysis begins by establishing that this consensus
is flawed. Rather, to minimize the costs associated with relitigation in a
foreign forum, we must distinguish between foreign claimants who are likely
to commence a subsequent foreign proceeding from those who are unlikely to
do so; distinguishing between those who come from recognizing and
nonrecognizing countries creates needless inefficiency. Using standard tools
of economic analysis, we examine the benefits and costs of the consensus rule
and compare them to the costs and benefits of other possible rules. In this
comparison, the consensus rule tends to perform poorly. As a matter of the-
ory, the most efficient rule for deciding which foreign citizens to include and
exclude is evident, but real-world informational constraints frustrate the ap-
plication of this rule in practice. Because no rule regarding the inclusion
and exclusion of foreign citizens is the most efficient in all situations, we
propose that courts use rebuttable presumptions: include foreign citizens with
claims that are not individually viable and exclude foreign citizens with
claims that are viable.
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INTRODUCTION
In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the Supreme Court
held that "§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides
[no] cause of action to foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and American
defendants for misconduct in connection with securities traded on
foreign exchanges."' In thus limiting "foreign-cubed" securities class
actions-class actions brought by foreign investors in connection with
foreign securities sold on foreign exchanges 2-Morrison is a significant
securities litigation decision with important implications for the extra-
territorial effect of American law. But the case does not address an
increasingly pressing question that affects all transnational class ac-
tions: When, if ever, should foreign citizens be included as members
of American class actions?3
The question is not a new one. Judge Henry J. Friendly first
raised it thirty-five years ago in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.4 Since
Bersch, courts have tied the answer to resjudicata and the recognition
of judgments: if a court in the country of which putative class mem-
bers are citizens will not recognize the judgment of an American
court, then the court should exclude those citizens from the class ac-
tion. Bersch's reasoning was twofold. First, Judge Friendly argued that
class actions "impose[ ] tremendous burdens on overtaxed district
1 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2875 (2010). Justice Sotomayor did not participate in the case.
Justice Breyer concurred in part and concurred in the judgment; Justice Stevens, joined by
Justice Ginsburg, concurred in thejudgment. Both concurrences declined to join the ma-
jority opinion due to the breadth of its holding, although both agreed that, on the facts of
the case, the foreign plaintiffs could not assert a claim under American law.
2 For pre-Morrison analyses of "foreign-cubed" actions, see Hannah L. Buxbaum, Mul-
tinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 14, 17 (2007); Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transna-
tional Litigation and Global Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 465, 466. "For-
eign-cubed" actions are also known as "f-cubed" actions. Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate
Litigation Across the Atlantic and the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REv. 1, 33
n.147 (2009). According to the Court of Appeals in Morrison, the phrase "foreign-cubed"
was coined in 2004. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir.
2008), affd, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
3 Although Morrison prevents some foreign litigants from becoming class members in
American securities fraud actions, the decision fails to address mass torts with foreign
victims, antitrust claims with effects on foreign victims, and suits involving foreign victims
who bought or sold securities on American markets.
4 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
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courts"-burdens that were unnecessarily shouldered when foreign
courts were free to disregard American judgments.5  Second, Judge
Friendly emphasized basic fairness and mutuality: if a foreign class
member could bind the defendant to a result that favored the class
member but a defendant could not bind the foreign class member to
a result that favored the defendant, the class action was a one-way
ratchet that always operated to the detriment of the defendant.6
The doctrinal hook that courts usually use to exclude foreign
members from nonrecognizing countries is the "superiority" element
of Rule 23(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 7 In the
words of a noteworthy recent case, In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Securities
Litigation, "resjudicata concerns have been appropriately grafted onto
5 Id. at 996. In another part of the opinion, Judge Friendly had held that federal
courts could give extraterritorial effect to section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
when the United States has an interest in either the purchasers or sellers of the securities at
stake. Id. at 984-90. Morrison abrogated this conclusion. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877-83.
It was on this point that Justice Stevens departed from the majority; he preferred Judge
Friendly's balancing approach to the majority's flat rule that gave section 10(b) no extra-
territorial effect. See id. at 2889-90 & n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring).
6 Bersch, 519 F.2d at 996 ("[Ilf defendants prevail against a class they are entitled to a
victory no less broad than a defeat would have been.").
7 Rule 23(b) describes four different types of class action. See FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b) (1) (A), (b)(1)(B), (b)((2), (b)(3). A court can certify a (b)(3) class only when it
"finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy." Id. at 23(b)(3).
These two elements are usually called the "predominance" and "superiority" prongs.
See also id. at 23(b) (3) (A)-(D) (listing four "matters pertinent to these findings"). Because
Rule 23(b) (3) is the only class action available when class members primarily seek dam-
ages, and because the (b) (3) class action is the most common form of class action, seeJAy
TIDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANGSRUD, MODERN COMPLEX LITIGATION 379 (2d ed. 2010), the
inclusion of foreign class members is principally a concern in, and has been litigated in the
context of, Rule 23(b) (3). One of the few circumstances in which (b) (1) or (b) (2) class
actions have sought to include foreign citizens involves medical-monitoring claims. See,
e.g., Bund Zur Unterstfitzung Radargeschdtdigter e. V. v. Raytheon Co., No. EP-O4-CV-127-
PRM, 2006 WL 3197645, at *4-*5 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2006) (noting that both American
and German citizens were members of a class seeking medical monitoring). In recent
years, however, courts have been hostile to certifying medical-monitoring claims. See, e.g.,
Grovatt v. St. Jude Med., Inc. (In re St. Jude Med., Inc., Silzone Heart Valve Prods. Liab.
Litig.), 425 F.3d 1116, 1121 (8th Cir. 2005) (rejecting certification of a medical-monitoring
class and noting that "[allthough Rule 23(b) (2) contains no predominance or superiority
requirements, class claims thereunder still must be cohesive").
Nonrecognition can also be relevant to other class-action issues. For instance, some
courts have also used a home country's unwillingness to recognize an American class judg-
ment as a reason to deny a foreign plaintiff's request to serve as a class representative. See,
e.g., Borochoff v. Glaxosmithkline PLC, 246 F.R.D. 201, 203, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re
Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 219 F.R.D. 343, 355 (D. Md. 2003). But see Marsden
v. Select Med. Corp., 246 F.R.D. 480, 486 & 489 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (appointing an Aus-
trian citizen as lead plaintiff and dismissing concerns that Austria would not recognize the
judgment as "speculative").
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the superiority inquiry." Although peripheral issues still occupy
courts and commentators, 9 the consensus view is that, when foreign
citizens hail from a country that is unlikely to recognize an American
class judgment or settlement, courts should exclude them from an
American class action.' 0
This consensus is wrong for a simple reason: it assumes that for-
eign class members will inevitably sue in their home country. In re-
cent years, however, mass-aggregation devices, some of which will
entertain the claims of foreigners, have proliferated around the
world." Thus, English subjects dissatisfied with an American class
8 242 F.R.D. 76,95 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120, 129
n.8 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting "significant doubts" about the superiority of a class action that
included Austrian citizens when Austrian courts would not bind these citizens to an Ameri-
can class judgment).
9 One issue is the standard of proof that the person opposing the class must bear.
Bersch had suggested that a defendant must show to a "near certainty" that a foreign coun-
try will not recognize the judgment; a "possibility" was insufficient. 519 F.2d at 996. More
recently, Vivendi has rejected this language insofar as it purported to create a standard of
proof; instead, it "evaluate [d] the risk of nonrecognition along a continuum" in determin-
ing the superiority (or lack thereof) of including foreign class members: "Where plaintiffs
are unable to show that foreign court recognition is more likely than not, this factor weighs
against a finding of superiority and, taken in consideration with other factors, may lead to
the exclusion of foreign claimants from the class." 242 F.R.D. at 95. Other courts have
adopted Vivendi's approach. See, e.g., In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 266, 282
(S.D.N.Y. 2008); Marsden, 246 F.R.D. at 486.
A second issue is the extent to which preclusion, as opposed to recognition, issues
should play into the superiority analysis. The usual focus has been on the foreign court's
willingness to recognize an American class judgment. But Professor Wasserman has re-
cently argued that, even if a foreign court will recognize such ajudgment, a separate ques-
tion is the scope of the preclusive effect that the judgment will receive in the foreign court.
Rhonda Wasserman, Transnational Class Actions and Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 313, 316 (2011).
Third, American courts sometimes disagree over a foreign court's law. For instance,
Vivendi held that Germany would, more likely than not, refuse to recognize an American
judgment, and excluded German citizens from the class. See 242 F.R.D. at 103-05. On the
other hand, another court thought this conclusion was "far from clear." See Frietsch v.
Refco, Inc., No. 92 C 6844, 1994 WL 10014, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 13, 1994). Likewise,
Vivendi held that France would, more likely than not, recognize an American judgment,
and included French citizens in the class. See 242 F.R.D. at 95-102. But the Republic of
France's amicus brief in Morrison calls that conclusion into doubt. See Brief for the Repub-
lic of France as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 26 & n.20, Morrison v. Nat'l
Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (No. 08-1191).
10 See Vivendi, 242 F.R.D. at 104-05. For additional cases, see, for example, Cromer
Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, 205 F.R.D. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (certifying a class that included foreign
investors); CL-Alexanders Laing & Cruikshank v. Goldfield, 127 F.R.D. 454 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (denying certification of a class of foreign investors); compare Blechner v. Daimler-
Benz AG, 410 F. Supp. 2d 366, 373 (D. Del. 2006) (noting nonrecognition issues in the
course of dismissing a securities fraud case).
11 American-style class actions remain uncommon, but in recent years numerous
countries have adopted class actions or their equivalents to resolve mass disputes. For
overviews of recent efforts, see Deborah R. Hensler, The Globalization of Class Actions: An
Overview, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 7, 9-17 (2009); Christopher Hodges,
Collective Redress in Europe: The New Model, 29 Civ. JusT. Q. 370, 372-74 (2010); Rachael
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judgment or settlement might attempt to relitigate the claim in an
aggregate proceeding conducted in a non-English forum that does
not recognize the American outcome. Moreover, if the claim is indi-
vidually viable, a foreign class member who is dissatisfied with the
American class judgment or settlement has reason to press the claim
in a hospitable foreign forum. 12 It is the generic risk of class mem-
bers' relitigation in a foreign forum-not the risk of foreign citizens'
relitigation in their home country-that raises the concerns Judge
Friendly identified. 13 Excluding citizens from nonrecognizing coun-
tries is a poor cure for this problem.
It is time, therefore, to reconsider the circumstances in which for-
eign citizens can become members of an American class action. Using
standard tools of economic analysis, this Article makes two arguments.
First, it argues that the weight Bersch and Vivendi place on
(non)recognition is too great. Because Bersch and Vivendi seek to
Mulheron, The Case for an Opt-Out Class Action for European Member States: A Legal and Empiri-
cal Analysis, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 409, 415-27 (2009). For example, in 2005 the Nether-
lands enacted the Wet collectieve afrikkeling massaschade (Collective Settlement of Mass
Damages Act, or WCAM), a statute that allows Dutch courts to settle-but not litigate-
transnational disputes on a class-wide, opt-out basis. Stb. 2005, p. 340, translated in MINIS-
TERIE VAN VEILIGHEIDE ENJUSTITIE, DE NEDERLANDSE WET COLLECTIEVE AFWIKKELING MASSAS-
CHADE 8-12 (2008), available at http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-
publicaties/rich tlij nen/2008/06/24/de-nederlandse-wet-collectieve-afwikkeling-massas-
chade/litwcamfrenknl.pdf. For a description of WCAM, see MINISTERIE VAN VEILICHEIDE
EN JUSTITIE, THE DUTCH "CLASS ACrION (FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT) ACT" ("WCAM") (2008),
available at http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/circu-
laires/2008/06/24/the-dutch-class-action-financial-settlement-act-wcam/wcamenglish.pdf.
The WCAM is open not only to Dutch citizens, but also to citizens of other countries.
See Madeleine Giansanti Qag et al., Europe, 44 INT'L LAW. 645, 652 (2010) (noting that two
recent settlements in Dutch courts "demonstrate that WCAM has truly global potential to
settle class claims, at least against Dutch defendants"). Because Dutch courts would likely
accord an American class judgment preclusive effect, see Vivendi, 242 F.R.D. at 105, class
members dissatisfied with the outcome of an American class action would probably be
unable to use the WCAM procedure. But that fact does not preclude the possibility that a
country that does not recognize American class judgments or settlements might create a
WCAM-type process and hold itself open to the claims of citizens from other countries.
12 It is possible that dissatisfied American citizens also might attempt to relitigate over-
seas, but they face significant legal obstacles to such an end run. Cf In re Bridgestone/
Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir. 2003) (issuing an
antisuit injunction against plaintiffs who attempted to commence state-court class actions
after the federal court held that no federal-court class action was permissible). But see In re
Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 146 (3d Cir.
1998) (reversing an antisuit injunction against a state-court class action designed to settle a
case on terms that the federal court had disapproved when the federal court lacked per-
sonal jurisdiction over the state-court class members). In this Article, we assume that an
American court could prevent American citizens from commencing subsequent litigation
in a foreign forum, but that it could not prevent foreign citizens from doing so (or at least
that those countries that would not recognize an American class judgment or settlement
would also not recognize an American antisuit injunction against foreign class members).
This assumption leaves only the issue of foreign citizens bringing subsequent proceedings
in a foreign forum.
13 Cf Bersch, 519 F.2d at 996 (summarizing Judge Friendly's concerns).
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avoid relitigation in foreign tribunals, the logical starting point is to
analyze the incentives that foreign citizens have to file either an initial
or a subsequent foreign proceeding. This analysis discloses that any
rule including and excluding foreign citizens yields certain benefits
and generates certain costs. A foreign country's (non)recognition of
the American outcome is relevant in determining these benefits and
costs, but it plays only a small role. Indeed, to maximize benefits, it
often makes sense to include as class members citizens from countries
that would not recognize an American class judgment or settlement,
and it is sometimes necessary to exclude citizens from countries that
would recognize an American class judgment or settlement.
Second, the Article argues that, in most real-world applications,
the Bersch-Vivendi rule is more costly (i.e., less efficient) than other
rules regarding the inclusion or exclusion of foreign citizens. 4 In-
deed, although no rule regarding foreign class membership is costless,
we can even specify the rule that is most efficient in theory: American
courts should include foreign citizens as long as the benefit that these
citizens receive from the American class action exceeds their expected
net benefit from subsequent foreign litigation and conversely should
exclude foreign citizens whose expected net benefit in a subsequent
foreign proceeding exceeds the benefit they receive in the American
proceeding. Because of the informational difficulties in applying this
rule and other alternatives to the Bersch-Vivendi rule, however, we con-
clude by suggesting that American courts should use a series of pre-
sumptions that, taken together, capture most of the benefits of the
ideal rule.
14 Throughout our analysis, we assume that a class including foreign citizens meets all
other requirements for class certification. Specifically, federal class actions must satisfy
Rule 23(a) in addition to Rule 23(b)(3).
This Article focuses on Federal Rule 23 for two reasons. First, many states employ
class-action rules or statutes comparable to Rule 23. See generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., State
and Foreign Class-Actions Rules and Statutes: Differences from-and Lessons for?-Federal Rule 23,
35 W. ST. U. L. REv. 147 (2007) (reviewing various state class-action approaches). Second,
with the advent of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), class actions that include foreign
members fall within federal jurisdiction-via either original or removal jurisdiction-as
long as one defendant is a citizen of an American state and the total amount in controversy
exceeds $5 million. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d) (2) (B), 1453(b) (2006). Most transnational class
actions are likely to meet these conditions. Cf id. § 1332(d) (4)-(5), (9) (listing certain
exceptions to CAFA jurisdiction).
We further limit our discussion to Rule 23(b) (3) class actions (and not Rule 23(b) (1)
or (b) (2) class actions) because most class actions are (b) (3) damages class actions. See
supra note 7. In limiting the discussion to (b) (3) class actions, which involve an opt-out
right, see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2) (B) (v), we also avoid thorny personal-jurisdiction ques-
tions that would arise if an American court sought to bind a foreign citizen to an American
judgment without affording an opt-out right. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797, 812-15 (1985) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires state courts to provide
an opt-out right to class members over whom it does not have personal jurisdiction, but
leaving open whether this requirement applied in all cases or only in cases seeking
damages).
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We prove our claims in five steps. In Part I we demonstrate that
the Bersch-Vivendi analysis is flawed. Part II lays the foundation for our
analysis by describing in economic terms the circumstances under
which a plaintiff chooses to form an American class action, an Ameri-
can judge determines superiority, and a foreign class member has an
incentive to bring a foreign suit after the American class action con-
cludes. Part III then uses the Bersch-Vivendi rule as the vehicle for
identifying the full range of benefits and costs that any rule of inclu-
sion or exclusion creates. It concludes that, in light of the present
developments in American class-action law and foreign collective-ac-
tion laws, the Bersch-Vivendi rule is very costly. Part IV then examines
five other rules-ranging from a rule automatically including all for-
eign citizens who otherwise meet the requirements of Rule 23 to a
rule automatically excluding all foreign citizens-and finds that each
imposes costs that make it less than ideal in some circumstances.
Therefore, Part V concludes by showing that a series of presump-
tions-starting with a presumption that foreign citizens who possess
small-stakes claims should be included in the American class action,
even if they come from a nonrecognizing country-is superior to ei-
ther the Bersch-Vivendi rule or any of Part IV's alternatives.
I
PROBLEMS WITH THE BERSCH-VIVENDI CONSENSUS
The Bersch-Vivendi rule,1 5 which permits American courts to in-
clude only those foreign citizens whose home countries recognize
American class judgments or settlements, suffers from two critical
flaws. First, the approach fails to account for the fact that foreign
claimants can forum shop. Like all litigants, foreign claimants will
choose the forum that maximizes their expected return, whether that
forum is in their home country or in a foreign country. By granting
class membership to claimants whose home forum will recognize an
American class judgment or settlement, the Bersch-Vivendi rule ignores
the fact that dissatisfied class members who hail from recognizing
countries may file subsequent litigation outside of their home
countries.
For example, Vivendi' 6 held that an American class judgment
would, more likely than not, be recognized in France, England, and
the Netherlands, but not in Germany and Austria.1 7 Based on this
15 Bersch, 519 F.2d at 996; Vivendi, 242 F.R.D. at 95. For additional cases, see supra
note 10.
16 Vivendi was a corporation organized under the laws of France. Throughout the
class period, approximately 25% Vivendi's shareholders were U.S. citizens, 37% were
French citizens, and the remainder were other European nationals. See Vivendi, 242 F.R.D.
at 81.
17 Id. at 96, 102, 104-05.
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analysis, the court concluded that French, English, and Dutch share-
holders should be included in the class, but German and Austrian
shareholders should be excluded.)8 While this holding protected
Vivendi from the risk that German or Austrian shareholders would
relitigate in their home courts, 19 it failed to extinguish the risk that
dissatisfied French, English, or Dutch class members might relitigate
in a German or Austrian court.20 Of course, some French, British, or
Dutch citizens might find such a suit too troublesome, but relitigation
by claimants who want another bite at the apple and who are willing
and able to sue again in a distant but hospitable forum remains a dis-
tinct possibility. In a world in which mass-aggregation devices are pro-
liferating and foreign victims of widespread harm have more cost-
effective forums from which to choose, the Bersch-Vivendi rule is less
and less capable of achieving the benefits of the lessened burden on
American courts and the fairness that Judge Friendly touted when he
excluded foreign citizens from nonrecognizing countries. 21
Second, and relatedly, the Bersch-Vivendi rule ignores certain
costs. Some costs arise from the actions of the foreign claimants we
have just discussed: foreign citizens who are included in the Ameri-
can class action because their countries will recognize the American
judgment or settlement, are dissatisfied with the result, and have a
sufficient amount at stake to make relitigation in a nonrecognizing
country worthwhile. Relitigating these claims in nonrecognizing fo-
rums imposes costs. Other costs arise from the inaction of a different
group of foreign citizens: those citizens from nonrecognizing coun-
tries who are excluded from the American class action and whose
claims are not sufficiently valuable to commence suit in a foreign fo-
rum, even though their claims had value in the American class action.
These foreign citizens fail to receive adequate compensation, and the
18 Id. at 105-06 ("Because lawsuits could be brought by Austrian and German nation-
als against defendants alleging the same wrongdoing that underlies the allegations in this
case, the Court concludes that the adjudication of German and Austrian shareholders'
claims in this class action is not necessarily superior."). The court did not explain why it
chose only these countries for analysis.
To the extent that Vivendi permitted citizens from the United States, England, France,
and the Netherlands who purchased Vivendi securities on foreign stock exchanges to be-
come American class members, the Supreme Court has effectively abrogated this result.
See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). In light of Morrison, the
district court in Vivendi has narrowed the class to consist of all persons from the United
States, England, France, and the Netherlands who acquired American Depository Receipts
of Vivendi and has dismissed allegations by U.S. and foreign purchasers of Vivendi's ordi-
nary shares on overseas exchanges. In reVivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d
512, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
19 Of course, the holding does not protect the defendants from initial suits filed by
German or Austrian shareholders in foreign courts.
20 We assume that the plaintiffs are able to satisfy the procedural and jurisdictional
requirements to file in these forums.
21 See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
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law fails to deter wrongdoers fully-even though the American class
action might have delivered a measure of both compensation and
deterrence.22
We do not suggest that the Bersch-Vivendi rule lacks any benefit; to
the contrary, the rule avoids important costs, such as the expense of
litigating in an American courtroom the meritless claims of excluded
foreign citizens who would not have sued elsewhere.2 3 But the con-
sensus approach, while trumpeting the savings it achieves, is blind to
the costs it imposes-costs that might exceed whatever savings the
rule achieves. Therefore, courts need a better understanding of the
costs and benefits of different approaches to including or excluding
foreign class members before choosing a rule concerning foreign citi-
zens' membership in transnational class actions.
Because the issue involves a comparison of costs, benefits,
probabilities, and risks regarding legal claims, an economic approach
seems an especially fruitful, but thus far unexplored, method of analy-
sis. The next Part lays the foundation for this analysis.
II
ASSUMPTIONS
This Part begins by describing the incentives of the plaintiff seek-
ing certification of the American class action. It then examines the
superiority analysis that American courts use to decide whether to cer-
tify a Rule 23(b) (3) class action-an analysis that, properly construed,
excludes some but not all foreign citizens from participating in the
American lawsuit. Finally, this Part examines the incentives of foreign
citizens who are included in the American class action to bring a for-
eign action after the conclusion of the American class action.
The analysis assumes that plaintiffs-including putative class rep-
resentatives and class members-are rational economic actors who
seek to maximize their wealth and are risk neutral. 2
4
22 The Bersch-Vivendi rule imposes other costs as well. See infra notes 66-76 and ac-
companying text.
23 See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
24 Both assumptions are common in the economic literature analyzing incentives to
sue or settle. See RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 598 (7th ed. 2007);
Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for
the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 56-58 (1982). For the most part, these
assumptions are not especially critical, at least when the parties retain their same attitude
toward wealth maximization and risk preference throughout the course of the American
and potential foreign litigation. But see infra note 105 (discussing the effect of risk taking
on the calculus of foreign citizens who must decide whether to sue in a foreign forum).
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A. Incentives for a Plaintiff to File an Individual or Class Suit
A plaintiff will file a suit only if the expected gains from the suit
outweigh the expected costs of litigation. Because American courts
generally operate under the "American rule," which requires that
each party bear its own costs of litigation,25 a putative plaintiff will
consider only her own costs of litigation. 26 Therefore, a plaintiff will
file suit only when her expected net benefit (expected gross benefit
minus her expected costs of litigation) exceeds zero.27
In a sense, the decision of a plaintiff to file a class action is not
that different. The American class action rests upon the idea that a
self-appointed agent serves as a private attorney general, seeking col-
lective redress on the agent's own behalf and that of absent class mem-
bers.28 A wealth-maximizing plaintiff will not take on this role unless
25 See Kansas v. Colorado, 129 S. Ct. 1294, 1298 (2009). There are exceptions to the
rule. First, losing parties sometimes must pay some costs of the winning party. See, e.g., 28
U.S.C. § 1920 (2006). Second, some statutes provide for fee shifting, under which the
losing party also pays the winning party's attorneys' fees. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)
(2006). See generally Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-62
(1975) (discussing the American rule and its exceptions).
26 These costs include not only the cost of litigating, but also the cost of errors by the
decision maker. POSNER, supra note 24, at 593-95.
27 Shavell, supra note 24, at 58-60 & nn.15-22. In formal terms, if P, represents the
probability of winning an individual suit, L, represents the value of the recovery if the
plaintiff wins, and C, represents the expected costs that the plaintiff must bear, a plaintiff
will bring an individual suit when
P, X L, - CI > 0.
The simple term C/ masks a complex reality. Because a successful plaintiff might be able to
shift some costs or fees to the defendant (and conversely might bear some of the costs or
fees of a successful defendant) even under the American rule, the precise formula for
filing suit is
P,x LI- [C,(,-NS) + (1-P,)Cl,-s) + (1-P,) C(-s)] > 0,
where C(,As) is the amount of the plaintiffs costs and fees that are nonshifting (i.e., costs
that the plaintiff must bear regardless of the suit's outcome), (1-P)C,(-s) is the expected
value of the plaintiff's costs and fees that the successful plaintiff can shift but the losing
plaintiffmust bear, and (1-P1) C(,A-s) is the expected value of the defendant's costs and fees
that the losing plaintiff must bear.
For simplicity, we refer to the expected net benefit, P x L, - C, as ENBI. Thus, a
plaintiff will file an individual suit when ENBI > 0.
28 See Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?,
62 VAND. L. REv. 179, 184 (2009); cf Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 21, 22-24 (1996) (arguing that class actions provide a mechanism to
allow private interests with small claims to protect public values); Judith Resnik, Money
Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individ-
ual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2145 (2000) (suggesting that the incen-
tive structure at play in the American class-action rule was seen as an alternative to
centralizing enforcement power within the government).
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the expected benefit from the class action 29 exceeds the expected
benefit of an individual action. 3
0
Because a class action can increase the probability of recovery
and possibly the amount of recovery, and because it can spread the
cost of litigation across all class members, 31 in some circumstances the
expected net benefit from a class action exceeds the expected net
benefit from a different form of action, and a plaintiff will seek class
certification. A classic example is the "large-scale, small-stakes" (or
"negative-value") suit, in which individual litigation is cost-prohibitive
given the small amount at issue for any plaintiff. Only by aggregating
claims and spreading the costs of litigation among all members does
prosecution of the claims become viable. 32
29 In formal terms, if PCA represents the probability of winning a class action, LcA rep-
resents the value of the recovery to the plaintiff if the class action succeeds, and CCA repre-
sents the expected costs that the plaintiff must bear in the class action, then a plaintiff will
bring a class action when
Pc xLc - CCA > 0,
or equivalently,
ENBcA > 0.
The term CcA is a shorthand form for the sum of nonshifting and shifting costs and fees
that the plaintiff might be expected to bear. See supra note 27. One difference in class-
action litigation is that class representatives often are not expected to bear the plaintiffs'
costs of litigation, but rather bear only the fractional share of those costs (calculated by
dividing the costs by the number of class members). This difference can result in a lower
exposure to costs as a class representative in class-action litigation than the plaintiff might
encounter in individual litigation. See generally Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Repre-
sentation, 87 TEx. L. REV. 1137, 1160 n.106 (2009).
30 Thus, a plaintiff will choose to file a class action when
ENBca > ENBI.
A plaintiff may have litigation options other than individual suit or class action, such as
joinder with similarly situated plaintiffs under Rule 20(a)(1) or multidistrict litigation
under 28 U.S.C. § 1407. These additional options do not affect the basic point: a plaintiff
will choose a class action when it yields a greater net benefit to her than any other form of
litigation and will not choose a class action when another form of litigation yields a greater
expected net benefit.
31 For an analysis of the ways in which a Rule 23(b)(3) class action can increase the
probability and amount of recovery or decrease costs in an amount sufficient to make a
plaintiff seek class certification, see Tidmarsh, supra note 29, at 1149-50, 1167-69; see also
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1465 n.3 (2010)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("A court's decision to certify a class accordingly places pressure
on the defendant to settle even unmeritorious claims."). The plaintiff may also seek class
certification when it is not in her best financial interests to do so-either because she is
altruistic or because the lawyer, who can obtain a much larger fee in a class action, deceives
the plaintiff about the form of litigation that is in her best interests. See Tidmarsh, supra
note 29, at 1147, 1150, 1161, 1166, 1169. For present purposes, it is sufficient to state that
plaintiffs sometimes file class actions, whether for economic or other reasons.
32 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) ("'The policy at the
very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries
do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her
rights."' (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997))); see also
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that using Rule 23 can
"transform a $500 case into a $5,000,000 award"). For a classic article on large-scale, small-
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Although it sometimes makes sense for a plaintiff to file a class
action, it is not always in the best interests of all of the members of the
putative class. Indeed, there is reason to worry that the class represen-
tative and class counsel will pursue their own interests at the expense
of the class and seek to capture all or most of the extra value created
by class aggregation for themselves and some subset of class members,
thus leaving other class members worse off than before. 33 To avoid
this prospect, Rule 23 and the Due Process Clause require that class
representative (s) and class counsel adequately represent the interests
of all class members. 34 Although the precise content of this require-
ment is uncertain, 35 we adopt a minimal definition of adequacy: class
representatives and class counsel can "do no harm."36 Their actions
must leave class members in no worse a position than they would have
occupied had they exercised their individual decisions to bring suit.
3 7
stakes litigation and the agency-cost problems it poses, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey
P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analy-
sis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991).
33 A famous example is described in Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506,
508 (7th Cir. 1996), in which a state-court negative-value class settlement had resulted in a
$2.19 recovery and a $91.33 assessment of attorneys' fees for some class members-thus
leaving these class members $89 to the bad as a result of their lawsuit. Cf Issacharoff &
Miller, supra note 28, at 184 (noting the power of the "unselected and effectively un-
supervised agent" to bind absent class members).
34 See FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(a)(2)-(4), (g); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43-46 (1940)
(discussing due process considerations regarding adequate class representation). Al-
though only Rule 23(a) (4) specifically mentions the adequacy of the class representative's
representation, the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a) (2) and the typicality require-
ment of Rule 23(a) (3) "tend to merge" into the adequacy requirement of Rule 23(a) (4).
Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982). Rule 23(g) discusses the
conditions under which class counsel is deemed adequate.
35 Tidmarsh, supra note 29, at 1151-58.
36 Id. at 1177.
37 In formal terms, if ENB(i)cA represents the expected net benefit to class member i
in a class action and ENB(i), represents the expected net benefit to class member i had i
brought an individual action, then class representation is adequate when, for each and
every class member i,
ENB(i) c = ENB(i)I, where ENB(i) cA = 0.
For the calculation of ENB(i)cA, see supra note 29; for the calculation of ENB(i) 1, see supra
note 27.
For an argument supporting this definition of adequacy in nonformal terms, see
Tidmarsh, supra note 29, at 1177; see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION
§ 1.05 cmt. f (2010) [hereinafter AGGREGATE LITIGATION] ("[A] lawyer may not help one
client by harming another .... A lead lawyer must act for the benefit of all parties and
represented persons.. .. "). The formulation has been criticized as too minimal, especially
in negative-value cases, because it allows the class representative(s) and class counsel to
capture all the excess value from class aggregation rather than to share it equitably among
class members. Patrick Woolley, Collateral Attack and the Role of Adequate Representation in
Class Suits for Money Damages, 58 KAN. L. REv. 917, 944-47 (2010). Although these concerns
are overdrawn due to real-world constraints on the self-aggrandizing behavior of class rep-
resentatives and counsel, see Tidmarsh, supra note 29, at 1190-99, no one argues for a
lower floor on adequate representation than "do no harm." We therefore adopt that floor
as the minimal necessary statement of adequacy.
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The need to assume the mantle of adequate representation un-
doubtedly limits the incentive for some plaintiffs to seek class certifica-
tion. But, as the persistence of class-action litigation shows, the
increase in either the probability of success, the quantum of recovery,
or the economies of scale achieved by a class action often makes it
worthwhile for a plaintiff to seek to represent a class of similarly situ-
ated individuals-including, in some cases, citizens of foreign
countries.
B. The Court's Decision to Certify a Class Action
Having set out the terms under which a plaintiff has an incentive
to file an American class action that contains foreign members, we
now address the judge's decision whether to certify a Rule 23(b) (3)
class containing such members. We assume that the class meets the
requirements of Rule 23(a), as well as the predominance requirement
of Rule 23(b) (3). Thejudge must then address Rule 23(b) (3)'s supe-
riority requirement.
Rule 23(b) (3) requires that a class action be "superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the contro-
versy."3 8 Courts have not always interpreted this requirement literally,
sometimes stating that, as long as the class action was "manageable" or
common issues predominated, superiority was established. 39 But most
courts do in fact read the superiority requirement literally, comparing
the class action with other methods for resolving the dispute.4 0 We
38 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
39 On using manageability as a surrogate for superiority, see FED. R. Crv. P.
23(b) (3) (D) (stating that "the likely difficulties in managing a class action" can be consid-
ered in deciding whether a class action meets the requirements of predominance and su-
periority); see also Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301,
1304-07 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding certification after examining only issues of managea-
bility); compare Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 191
(3d Cir. 2001) (noting that a class action must be the "best" method for resolving the
dispute, but in fact analyzing superiority almost exclusively in terms of the class action's
manageability); Romero v. Producers Dairy Foods, Inc., 235 F.R.D. 474, 491 (E.D. Cal.
2006) ("Whether a case is manageable as a class action can be an overriding consideration
in determining superiority." (internal quotation marks omitted)). But see Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc. (In reVisa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig.), 280 F.3d 124, 140
(2d Cir. 2001) (" [F] ailure to certify an action under Rule 23(b) (3) on the sole ground that
it would be unmanageable is disfavored ....").
On using predominance to determine superiority, see In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel)
Antitrust Litig., 267 F.R.D. 291, 314 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ("[I]f common questions are found
to predominate in an antitrust action,... courts generally have ruled that the superiority
prerequisite of Rule 23(b)(3) is satisfied." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
40 See, e.g., In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 309 (3d Cir. 2005) ("The superi-
ority requirement asks a district court to balance, in terms of fairness and efficiency, the
merits of a class action against those of alternative available methods of adjudication." (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)); Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1269 (11th Cir.
2004) ("Our focus is not on the convenience or burden of a class action suit per se, but on
the relative advantages of a class action suit over whatever other forms of litigation might
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define superiority similarly: only when the expected net benefits from
class treatment exceed the expected net benefits from other forms of
handling the dispute-such as individual litigation, voluntary or invol-
untaryjoinder, consolidation, multidistricting, bankruptcy, antisuit in-
junctions, or preclusion 41-should a court certify a class action.
Superiority is determined along two dimensions. First, a class ac-
tion should be optimally sized, meaning that class members should be
added as long as the marginal gain from adding an additional class
member exceeds the marginal cost of doing so. 42 Second, the ex-
pected net benefit from using a class action (calculated by subtracting
the cost of using a class action from the expected gross benefit of us-
ing the class action) should be greater than the expected net benefit
from using each other form for resolving the dispute (calculated by
subtracting the cost of using that form of resolution from the ex-
pected gross benefit of using that form of resolution) .4 The combi-
nation of these two aspects of superiority ensures that a certified class
action yields the greatest social benefit consistent with the adequacy-
of-representation requirement that no class member be made worse
off.
This definition of superiority constructs a truly superior class ac-
tion, which yields more aggregate benefits to the victims of the defen-
dant's wrongdoing than any other aggregation mechanism or
be realistically available to the plaintiffs."). The American Law Institute has also taken this
view. See AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 37, § 2.02(a) (1) (arguing that a court should
use a class action to resolve common issues when doing so will "materially advance the
resolution of multiple civil claims by addressing the core of the dispute in a manner supe-
rior to other realistic procedural alternatives, so as to generate significant judicial efficien-
cies"); id. cmt. b ("The judicial inquiry.., is inherently comparative .... ").
41 On the range of alternatives to class treatment, see TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra
note 7, at 51-248, 565-629.
42 This "marginal benefit exceeding marginal loss" rule for determining optimal class
size generally holds true, but is imprecise when there are multiple equilibrium points at
which the marginal benefit of adding an additional class member equals the marginal cost
of doing so. For a full analysis, see David Betson &Jay Tidmarsh, Optimal Class Size, Opt-Out
Rights, and "Indivisible" Remedies, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 542, 554-68 (2011). In analyzing
whether a foreign court's nonrecognition of an American outcome should serve as yet
another ground for finding a lack of superiority-the concern of this Article-we can ig-
nore concerns for optimal class size, except to note that the optimal size of the class helps
to define the aggregate benefit that the class can expect to achieve. The size of this aggre-
gate benefit, as well as the effect of excluding class members on this benefit, is relevant to
our analysis. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
43 If the total number of victims is N and the optimal number of class members is G,
so that N = G, we can define superiority as
ENB(G) CA > ENB(A).-n,
where ENB(G)c represents the expected net benefit from the class action (i.e., P(G)cA x
L(G)ca - C(G)cA), and ENB(N),_n represents the sum of expected net benefits from any
dispute-resolution alternative or combination of dispute-resolution alternatives (individual
adjudication, multidistricting, foreign litigation or resolution, multiple smaller class ac-
tions, and so on) available to any or all of the victims.
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combination of mechanisms. It is important to note that this formula-
tion of superiority works in the aggregate, not at the individual level.
It does not require that the benefit to any given class member is
greater than the benefit that a victim of the defendant's wrongdoing
might receive through the dispute-resolution mechanism that is best
for that victim. 44 Thus, even if some class members could do better by
not being included in the class action, it is permissible to include
them in the class action when the benefit to the class from their inclu-
sion exceeds the benefit to the individual class members from their
exclusion.45 On the other hand, the court should exclude from the
class any class members for whom the combination of the expected
net benefit from the class action without those members and the ex-
pected net benefit they will achieve in separate proceedings exceeds
the expected net benefit from a class action including them.
4 6
This definition of superiority might require a court to exclude
some foreign class members. For instance, given the difficulty of ef-
fecting notice overseas, 47 as well as likely difficulties in calculating and
delivering a remedy to foreign citizens, the cost of including certain
foreign class members might exceed the expected benefits derived
from adding their claims. In that situation, the optimally sized class
44 The adequacy-of-representation requirement demands only that class treatment
leave each class member no worse off than the member would have been had she pursued
an individual remedy. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. But some class members
might have done better with another form of dispute resolution than with either a class
action or an individual action. Moreover, those victims excluded from an optimally sized
class might have benefitted from some aggregation mechanism now made unworkable be-
cause of the class certification.
45 Formally, in a class of G members, there may be some class member(s) k for whom
ENB(k), > ENB(k)c,, where ENB(k), represents the expected net benefit that member k
could receive in a separate proceeding or set of proceedings and ENB(k)cA represents the
expected net benefit that k could receive in the class action (i.e., P(k)CA x L(k)CA - C(k)cA).
If K represents the total number of class member(s) k, it is permissible to include mem-
ber(s) k in the class when
ENB(G) CA> ENB(G-K)cA + ENB(K).,
where ENB(G-K)cA is the expected net benefit of a class action that does not include mem-
ber(s) k (i.e., P(G-K)cA x L(G-K~c - C(G-K)cA).
46 Formally, in a class of size G, there may be some class member(s) I for whom
ENB(l), > ENB(l)cA, where ENB(l), represents the expected net benefit that I could receive
in a separate proceeding or set of proceedings and ENB(1)cA represents the expected net
benefit that lcould receive in the class action (i.e., P(l)cA x L(/)cA - C(/)c ). IfL represents
the total number of class members , then these member(s) should not be included when
ENB(G)c, < ENB(G-L)cA + ENB(L),
where ENB(G-L)cA is the expected net benefit of a class action that does not include mem-
bers I (i.e., P(G-L)c, x L(G-L)ci - C(G-L)cA).
47 See generally Jeanne C. Finegan, Five Key Considerations for a Successful International
Notice Program, 78 U.S.L.W. 2611 (Apr. 20, 2010) (discussing issues about giving effective
class notice to foreign citizens). Notice of the right to opt out must be given in all Rule
23(b) (3) class actions. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2) (B). In addition, the court will direct
that notice be given in the event of a settlement, see id. at 23(e) (1), and can direct that
notice be given for other major litigation events, see id. at 23(d) (1) (B).
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does not include those citizens. Likewise, if the laws of a significant
number of countries apply to the case, then the management of the
American class action might become so difficult and costly that the
inclusion of foreign citizens might not be worthwhile. 48 And some
foreign class members might have a more effective remedy available
to them in their home country or in another country. Unless their
exclusion submarines the viability of the claims of the remaining
members of the putative American class by an amount that exceeds
the additional benefits these foreign citizens obtain in the foreign pro-
ceeding,49 the lack of the class action's superiority requires a court to
exclude foreign class members on this ground.
Therefore, courts are sometimes justified in excluding foreign
class members on superiority grounds. But such exclusions have noth-
ing to do with whether a foreign court will (or will not) recognize an
American class judgment or settlement. The present issue, however,
is whether a foreign country's (non)recognition of an American class
judgment or settlement constitutes an independent step in the superi-
ority analysis. Before we can address that question, we need to de-
scribe one more matter: the incentive that foreign citizens have to file
foreign proceedings after the conclusion of the American class action.
C. Incentive to File a Subsequent Foreign Suit
The Bersch-Vivendi rule overlooks an essential intermediate step by
assuming that citizens of a foreign country will in fact file subsequent
48 Cf Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 1996) (refusing to cer-
tify a nationwide mass-tort class action in part because "variations in state law may swamp
any common issues and defeat predominance"). But see Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d
1241, 1261, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004) (acknowledging Castano's rule but stating that "if a claim
is based on a principle of law that is uniform among the states, [or] if the applicable state
laws can be sorted into a small number of groups, each containing materially identical
standards, then certification.., can be appropriate").
49 For example, assume that fifty Americans and five million Dutch citizens are in-
jured. Each American suffers a loss of $10,000; each Dutch citizen a loss of $1. Assume as
well that the probability of recovery in an American class action is 40% (a $200,000 ex-
pected benefit for the Americans and a $2,000,000 expected benefit for the Dutch). Costs
of $220,000 are assessed proportionally ($20,000 against the Americans and $200,000
against the Dutch). Further assume that, in a WCAM settlement in the Netherlands, see
supra note 11, the defendant proposes to settle the Dutch citizens' claims for $2,100,000,
but refuses to settle the American claims. Costs in the WCAM proceeding are $210,000.
Finally, assume that the loss of the Dutch class members makes a class suit by the fifty
Americans less valuable, so that the Americans would recover a total of only $50,000
($200,000 less costs of $150,000) if the Dutch citizens were excluded. In this situation, the
greater social benefit is achieved with a single American class action ($2,200,000 -
$220,000, or $1,980,000) than with a combination of an American class action for Ameri-
can citizens and a WCAM proceeding for Dutch citizens ($50,000 + ($2,100,000 -
$210,000), or $1,940,000)-even though the Dutch citizens themselves are not as well off
being included in the American class action (receiving only $1,800,000 ($2,000,000 -
$200,000) in the American class action, as opposed to $1,890,000 ($2,100,000 - $210,000)
in the WCAM proceeding).
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suits in their home forums when those forums do not enforce the
American judgment or settlement. But that assumption does not nec-
essarily hold true.
In examining a foreign citizen's incentive to file or participate in
a subsequent suit,50 we begin by designating as X the gross amount
that a foreign class member who is included in the American class
action receives from the judgment or settlement. The value of X
could be $0 (in the event the class loses or the settlement results in no
compensation to the foreign class member), or it could be some
amount greater than $0.51 We now make two assumptions about X
First, we assume that the foreign court will offset X from the amount
that it will award in the foreign proceeding for the same injury.5 2 Sec-
ond, we assume that a foreign citizen will choose the form of foreign
proceeding (whether an individual action or an aggregated suit or set-
tlement) that yields the greatest individual benefit.53
5o Although we talk about the incentives that foreign citizens have to file a subsequent
suit, our analysis includes both those who file a suit and those who become willing parties
to it. For instance, our analysis includes those who join a suit filed by another and those
who decline to opt out of a collective proceeding in which they have opportunity to do so.
51 Because of the "do no harm" requirement for determining adequacy of representa-
tion, see supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text, X cannot fall below $0.
52 In American law, a party cannot generally obtain "more than a single full compen-
satory recovery for an injury.... If... earlier recoveries truly compensate the plaintiff for
the same injury, they can and will be used to offset the current damages award." Niccum v.
Meyer (In re Meyer), Nos. 97-2318, 97-2492, 98-2090, 1998 WL 538160, at *6 (7th Cir. Aug.
21, 1998). But see Zivitz v. Greenberg, 279 F.3d 536, 540 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[C]ourts should
not impose a setoff against a recovery from injuries separate and distinct from those for
which the plaintiff was already compensated .. " (citing Pasquale v. Speed Prods. Eng'g,
654 N.E.2d 1365, 1382 (l11. 1995))); Turner v. Municipality of Anchorage, 171 P.3d 180,
190 (Alaska 2007) ("The purpose of offset... is avoiding double recovery; therefore, if the
prior payment was for a different injury than the one compensated at trial, no issue of
double recovery arises."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2) (1977) (describing
situations in which an offset is not appropriate). Although our assumption is that a foreign
court will deduct the gross amount received by a plaintiff in the American action, the
plaintiff nets less than this amount in the American case due to the costs of litigation (i.e.,
for a foreign class member f, the amount netted is X(1) - C(j)Ac).
Some foreign courts adopt a similar principle. See Asmundsson v. Iceland, 2004-IX
Eur. Ct. H.R. 307, 319 (2004) (describing "the basic principle in the law on liability that
the claimant should receive full compensation, but not more"); Miller v. Cooper, [1994] 1
S.C.R. 359, 396 (Can.) ("[In tort actions,] the plaintiff is not entitled to a double recovery
for any loss arising from the injury."); id. at 369 (McLachlin, J., dissenting) ("The ideal of
compensation which is at the same time full and fair is met by awarding damages for all the
plaintiff's actual losses, and no more.... Double recovery is not permitted."); Jameson v.
Cent. Elec. Generating Bd., [2000] 1 A.C. 455 (H.L.) 471-72 (appeal taken from Eng.)
("The basic rule is that a plaintiff cannot recover more by way of damages than the amount
of his loss.... The principle of full satisfaction prevents double recovery." (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
If a foreign court does not offset any recovery received in the American proceeding,
then X can be treated as $0.
53 In the event that the foreign citizen chooses to bring an aggregate proceeding, we
do not assume that the foreign citizen will pick the form of proceeding that maximizes the
recovery to the group as a whole. Nor do we assume that the foreign citizen is bound by a
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Under these assumptions, it is easy to specify the circumstance in
which a foreign class member has an incentive to file or participate in
a subsequent foreign proceeding: a foreign class member will choose
to file a subsequent foreign suit only if the amount that she expects to
realize from the foreign proceeding (i.e., the expected gross benefit
of a foreign suit minus X, the gross amount already obtained in the
American suit) exceeds the cost of bringing the foreign suit.54
In calculating the expected net benefit of a foreign suit, however,
a foreign class member must factor in the risk that the foreign forum
in which the claim is filed will recognize the American judgment or
settlement. If the foreign forum recognizes the judgment or settle-
ment and gives it preclusive effect, then the foreign class member will
receive nothing; if the court does not recognize the judgment or set-
tlement, then the case can proceed.55 Thus, the issue of nonrecogni-
tion bears on foreign class members' incentive to sue; it is a downside
risk that makes participation in a subsequent suit more risky and the
expected recovery less valuable.5 6
"do no harm" principle that requires the foreign citizen to ensure that others brought
within the aggregated proceeding are at least as well off as they would be had they retained
control of their own case, cf supra note 37 and accompanying text (adopting this principle
for an American class representative), or that those who are not left as well off can opt out
of the proceeding. If we were to adopt these additional assumptions, the cost to the for-
eign citizen of bringing an aggregated foreign proceeding would rise, making commence-
ment of a foreign proceeding less desirable or likely. We decline to make these
assumptions in order to test our analysis under circumstances that maximize the incentive
to file subsequent foreign proceedings.
54 This choice is a variant of the choice made by a plaintiff initially deciding whether
to sue. See supra Part II.A.
55 We assume here that the foreign forum will give the American class judgment or
settlement claim-preclusive effect. For a discussion of a foreign forum affording the judg-
ment or settlement issue-preclusive effect, see infra note 56.
56 Thus, a class member fwil initiate or participate in a suit in a foreign forum when
PN X P(J)F X L(I)F- C(iF > X(J),
where P is the probability that the foreign forum will not recognize the American judg-
ment or settlement, P(J)F represents the probability of recovery by a foreign class memberf
in a foreign forum, L(J)OF represents the expected recovery that the foreign class member
will receive in the foreign forum, C(J)F represents the costs of proceeding in a foreign
forum, and X0 represents the gross amount received by the foreign class member in the
American class proceeding (i.e., the setoff amount).
Because the foreign courts of which we are aware apply the "loser pays" rule, see, e.g.,
INTERNATIONAL CML PROCEDURE 752 (Shelby R. Grubbs ed., 2003) (noting that in Switzer-
land the losing party must pay both court costs and the winning party's attorneys' fees), the
calculation of C(j)F is somewhat complex. It is roughly equivalent to the formula already
described supra note 27; because shifting of attorneys' fees to the losing party is highly
probable, its terms have more bite. Thus, C(I)F is more precisely represented as
C_NS) + (l-P) CRP-S + (1-P) CR_ ,
where CgNS) represents the amount of the plaintiffs costs in the foreign litigation that are
nonshifting (i.e., costs that the plaintiff must bear regardless of the suit's outcome), (I-
P) CRp- is the expected value of the plaintiffs costs and attorneys' fees that the successful
plaintiff can shift but the losing plaintiff must bear, and (1-P) Cns is the expected value
2011] FOREIGN CITIZENS IN TRANSNA TIONAL CLASS ACTIONS 105
Therefore, some-but not all-foreign citizens who are included
in an American class action will have an incentive to file or participate
in a subsequent foreign proceeding. A foreign forum's willingness to
recognize an American class judgment or settlement is a relevant con-
cern for foreign citizens considering whether to commence a foreign
proceeding. What is not yet clear, and what Parts III and IV address, is
whether a foreign court's willingness to recognize an American class
judgment or settlement is also a relevant concern for an American
court deciding whether to include citizens from that country as mem-
bers in the American class action-in other words, whether the Bersch-
Vivendi rule is right.
III
THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE BERSCH-VVENDI RULE
From an economic point of view, the goal of any legal rule, in-
cluding a rule regarding class membership, is to yield the greatest so-
cial benefit (or, put differently, to minimize social coSt). 5 7 This Part
illustrates that, in many circumstances, the Bersch-Vivendi rule is likely
to be more costly than a rule that includes foreign citizens in Ameri-
can class actions without regard to the attitude of the citizens' home
forum toward recognition of American class judgments and
settlements. 58
of the defendant's costs and attorneys' fees that the losing plaintiff must bear. It is impor-
tant to note that, unlike the formula discussed supra note 27, these costs are the additional
costs of the foreign proceeding; any costs obviated by the prior American litigation (per-
haps certain discovery costs) are not included. On the other hand, any additional costs
generated by the prior litigation (perhaps a dispute over whether some evidence discov-
ered in the American case is admissible in the foreign proceeding) are included. For sim-
plicity, we represent this constellation of costs as C(J)F.
The equation in the first paragraph of this footnote assumes that a court's recognition
of the American judgment or settlement would bar the subsequent foreign claim. If the
American judgment or settlement instead precluded relitigation only of an issue, see Was-
serman, supra note 9, at 344-45 (discussing issue-preclusive effects of American judgments
in foreign litigation), then the equation would be slightly different. There would need to
be two calculations of expected net benefit, one made on the assumption that relitigation
of the issue is not barred and the other made on the assumption that it is barred. The first
calculation would be multiplied by PN, the second by (1-P). The two products would then
be averaged.
57 We measure social welfare on a global scale. Although some rules of class member-
ship might be more favorable to one court system or another (for instance, a flat rule
excluding all foreign citizens imposes far fewer costs on American courts than any rule of
inclusion), our interest is in finding the rule that imposes the lowest overall cost on all
interested parties-plaintiffs, defendants, and the dispute-resolution systems of all involved
countries.
58 As we have described, the adequacy requirement of Rule 23(a) or the superiority
element of Rule 23(b) (3) might lead an American court to exclude a foreign citizen from
the class. See supra notes 7, 47-49 and accompanying text. The issue here is whether the
(non)recognition of an American class judgment or settlement by a foreign citizen's own
court system is a separate and distinct ground for exclusion of that citizen.
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We begin by identifying the benefits of the Bersch-Vivendi rule.
There are five in total (two relating to the inclusion of foreign citizens
from recognizing countries and three relating to the exclusion of for-
eign citizens from nonrecognizing countries). First, the Bersch-Vivendi
approach provides compensation in the American class action to the
included foreign citizens. 59 Second, for those included citizens who
would have had an incentive to sue in a foreign forum but for the
recovery they received in an American class action, the rule saves ex-
cess costs, if any, associated with the avoided foreign litigation. 60
Third, the rule still allows excluded foreign citizens with an incentive
to litigate to obtain compensation in a foreign forum. 61 Fourth, for
excluded foreign citizens with an incentive to litigate overseas, the ap-
proach saves the excess costs, if any, associated with the avoided Amer-
ican class action. 62 Fifth, for those foreign citizens who lack an
incentive to sue in a foreign forum and whose claims ultimately would
have been found to lack merit in the American case, the Bersch-Vivendi
59 The foreign citizens from recognizing countries who are included in the class
under the Bersch-Vivendi rule fall into two categories: those with an incentive to commence
a subsequent foreign proceeding and those without such an incentive. A foreign citizen j
from a recognizing country has an incentive to commence a subsequent foreign proceed-
ing when the equation X(j) < PN X P(J)F x L(J)F - C(])F holds true. See supra note 56. A
foreign citizen h from a recognizing country has no incentive to commence a subsequent
foreign proceeding when the equation X(h) > PN x P(h)F x L(h)F - C(h)F holds true. See
supra note 54 and accompanying text. Therefore, if we let Hrepresent the total number of
class members h and J represent the total number of class members j, the net benefit of
including these class members in the American class action is represented by the equation
X(H) - C(H)cA + X(J) - C(Q)ca, or X(H+J+) - C(H+J) cA.
60 If H1 represents the total number of foreign citizens from recognizing countries
who would have sued but for the recovery they received in the American class action (i.e.,
those foreign citizens h, for whom X(hj) > PN X P(h,)Fx L(h)F- C(hl)F, and P(hj)Fx L(h)F-
C(h)F> 0), these avoided costs can be expressed as C(HI)F- C(H)cA, if C(HI)F > C(H)Ca.
61 An excluded foreign citizen q from a nonrecognizing country has an incentive to
commence a foreign proceeding when the equation P(q)F X L(q)F - C(q)F > 0 holds true.
See supra Part II.A. We use the variable Y(Q) to represent the total benefit the citizens q
receive in the foreign proceeding. The net benefit to these class members is represented
by the equation Y(Q) - C(QF.
62 For this cost, we consider all the duplicative or unnecessary costs that are avoided-
including the costs of the plaintiffs, the costs of the defendants, and the costs of the
court-rather than just the costs of the plaintiffs. These avoided costs can be expressed as
C(Q + A + court)cA - C(Q + A + court) , if C(Q + A + court)cA > C(Q + A + court). For
simplicity, we use the variable C(Q)cA(ou to represent the total of these avoided costs.
Not all costs are duplicative or unnecessary. For instance, if a foreign court is willing
to use a deposition taken in the American case, taking the deposition in the American
court is not an unnecessary cost. On the other hand, if the foreign court would require a
new deposition, the American deposition is duplicative; or if a foreign court does not per-
mit the use of the American deposition, the cost of the American deposition is unneces-
sary. Likewise, the cost of giving notice to the excluded class members, see supra note 47
and accompanying text, is avoided.
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rule avoids the costs spent in the American case to litigate the
claims. 63
The total benefit of the Bersch-Vivendi rule is the sum of these
benefits and avoided costs. 64 If any of these five terms is less than
zero, it is treated as being equal to zero. In some situations, it is possi-
ble that the Bersch-Vivendi rule will yield no benefit. For instance,
when the only putative foreign class members are citizens of
nonrecognizing countries with no incentive to litigate in a foreign
country, none of the benefits of the Bersch-Vivendi rule are realized.
But these are rare cases. In most situations, the Bersch-Vivendi rule will
yield some benefit.
On the other hand, the Bersch-Vivendi rule imposes eight costs.
Three of these costs relate to the inclusion of some citizens (those
from recognizing countries), four relate to the exclusion of other citi-
zens (those from nonrecognizing countries), and one relates to the
rule's administrability. First, as we have seen, citizens from countries
that recognize an American class judgment or settlement might still
commence subsequent actions in a nonrecognizing country. 65 Addi-
tional compensation, if any, that these citizens obtain in subsequent
foreign suits is an error cost when both the American and foreign
courts are compensating for precisely the same injuries and attempt-
ing to achieve precisely the same deterrence of defendants' conduct
that the prior American case accomplished. 66 A second, related cost is
the expense incurred by these plaintiffs, by the defendants, and by the
foreign tribunal resolving these subsequent suits. 67 A third cost arises
when some included foreign citizens could have obtained larger net
recoveries in a foreign proceeding due to noncumulative forms of
compensation that a foreign court would have granted, but the citi-
zens no longer have an incentive to obtain the additional relief be-
63 An excluded foreign citizen r from a nonrecognizing country has no incentive to
commence a foreign proceeding when the equation P(r)F x L(r)F - C(r)F < 0 holds true.
For some individuals r, within this group, the American case would have yielded nothing
(i.e., X(rl) = 0). The benefit from avoiding litigation expenses for this group is C(R)cA.
The amount of this benefit is not likely to be large. If the claim would have been found to
lack merit in the American class action on liability grounds, the presence of the foreign
citizen probably added nothing to the class's cost of attempting unsuccessfully to prove
that liability. If the claim would have been denied on grounds that required individual
proof of the excluded citizen's claim (e.g., on damages grounds), however, this cost does
arise. Another cost that exclusion avoids is the cost of giving individual notice to the ex-
cluded members.
64 In other words, the total net benefit is (1) X(H + J) - C(H + J)c + (2) C(HI)-
C(hl) cA + (3) Y(Q) - C(Q)F + (4) C(Q) A(a/) + (5) C(RI) cA. See supra notes 59-63 and accom-
panying text.
65 See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text; supra Part II.C.
66 IfJ represents the total number of foreign citizens with an incentive to file subse-
quent foreign litigation, see supra note 59, the net amount of overcompensation can be
represented as Y(J) - CJ) - X(J), if Y(}) > X(J) and Y(]) - C(J) > 0.
67 We can represent this cost as Co])m.
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cause of the relief obtained in the American class action. From the
viewpoint of the foreign tribunal, the American action has led to un-
dercompensation and underdeterrence. 68
Fourth, excluded foreign citizens (i.e., those from nonrecogniz-
ing countries) who have no incentive to commence foreign proceed-
ings but who would have had meritorious claims in the American class
action fail to receive compensation for the harms they suffer; their
undercompensation (or, equivalently, the defendants' underdeter-
rence) is a significant cost of the Bersch-Vivendi rule.69 Fifth, if ex-
cluded foreign citizens with an incentive to commence a foreign
proceeding receive less net compensation in the foreign litigation
than the amount that they would have received had they been in-
cluded in the American class action, and the extra amount of the pu-
tative American award would have compensated these citizens for
injuries that the foreign court would not allow, this undercompensa-
tion is a cost. 70 Sixth, to the extent that the American class action
would have been more efficient in obtaining recovery of the same
damages at lower cost, the Bersch-Vivendi rule imposes a cost on the
excluded citizens. 71 Seventh, when a class is reduced to less than opti-
mal size through the exclusion of some foreign class members needed
to optimize the size of the class, the recovery for the remainder of the
class is less than the recovery an optimally sized class would have re-
covered. Members of the American class action thus receive less re-
68 If H, represents the total number of foreign citizens from recognizing countries
who would have sued but for the recovery they received in the American class action, see
supra note 60, if Y(HI) represents the amount of nonduplicative relief they would have
received in a foreign forum, and if C(H)r represents the costs that the plaintiffs h, would
have expended to obtain this relief, this cost can be expressed as Y(H) - C(HI)F. It is
unlikely that this cost will exist in many lawsuits, or that it will be a significant factor in the
remainder. The reason is that the requirement of superiority already excludes many for-
eign citizens who can obtain better relief in a foreign proceeding. See supra notes 43-46,
49 and accompanying text.
69 If R represents the total number of excluded foreign citizens from nonrecognizing
countries without an incentive to commence a foreign proceeding, see supra note 63, we
can represent the net amount of this cost as X(R) - C(R)ca. As we have described, some
individuals within this group, rl, have claims that lack merit (i.e., X(r) = 0). See supra note
63. For these individuals, exclusion under the Bersch-Vivendi rule does not generate this
particular cost.
70 If Q represents the total number of excluded foreign citizens from nonrecognizing
countries with an incentive to commence a foreign proceeding, see supra note 61, X(Q)
represents the amount of nonduplicative relief that the plaintiffs q would have received in
the American class action, and C(Q)cA represents the total costs that the plaintiffs q would
have expended to obtain this relief in the American court, we can represent this amount as
X(Q) - C(Q).
71 If Q represents the total number of excluded foreign citizens from nonrecognizing
countries with an incentive to commence a foreign proceeding, see supra note 61, we can
express this cost as C(Q)F- C(Q)cA, if C(Q)F > C(p)cG.
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covery than they might otherwise have, once again resulting in
undercompensation and underdeterrence.
72
Eighth, and finally, the Bersch-Vivendi rule imposes costs because
the parties and judge in the American case must invest time and en-
ergy to determine whether a foreign country will recognize an Ameri-
can class judgment or settlement.73
The total cost of the Bersch-Vivendi rule is the sum of these eight
costs, not all of which are implicated in any given case. For instance, if
the only foreign class members came from recognizing countries and
they had claims of insufficient value to justify relitigation in a foreign
forum, only the last cost (determining whether the citizens' home
country will recognize the judgment) is implicated. But this is a rare
case, and in most situations, the Bersch-Vivendi rule will impose more
significant costs.' 4
If the costs of the Bersch-Vivendi rule outweigh its benefits, the
rule cannot be justified on economic grounds. Conversely, if its bene-
fits outweigh the costs, then the rule stands on firmer footing-unless
an even less costly alternative exists. A cursory examination of the last
few paragraphs and footnotes, which have tried to describe these ben-
efits and costs in quantitative terms, reveals the complexity of deter-
mining the value of the Bersch-Vivendi rule. Indeed, many of the
benefits and costs cannot be quantified with certainty.
Even if precise calculations cannot be made, several points are
evident. First, the Bersch-Vivendi rule is far from costless. Second,
there are realistic situations in which the costs of the rule outweigh its
benefits. For instance, if no foreign citizens have viable claims in any
foreign forum, then the rule avoids no relitigation costs, while exclu-
sion denies citizens from nonrecognizing countries the opportunity to
receive compensation in an American forum.
Third, given the structure of modern American class-action law
and changes in the international mass-aggregation environment, it is
72 For a discussion of optimal class size, see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
Because the Bersch-Vivendi rule excludes any foreign citizen q from a nonrecognizing coun-
try who will file in a foreign forum, as well as any foreign citizen r from a nonrecognizing
country who will not file after exclusion, we represent this cost with the variable Z(Q+ R).
In some cases, the absence of some foreign class members will not affect the value of the
American class action for remaining class members; this cost arises only if Z(Q + R) is
positive.
73 For instance, in Vivendi, the parties "submitted voluminous competing expert dec-
larations on the question of whether foreign courts would grant preclusive effect to a
United States judgment or settlement in this action." See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec.
Litig., 242 F.R.D. 76, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). We represent this cost with the variable d.
74 In other words, the total net cost is: (1) Y(J) - C(J) - X(J) + (2) C(J)R.Ir + (3) Y(H 1 )
- C(H,)F+ (4) X(R) - C(R)ca) + (5) X(Q) - C(Q) + (6Q)C(U3F- C(Q CA + (7) Z(Q + R) + (8)
. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text. If any of these eight costs is less than
zero, it is treated as being equal to zero; that set of costs does not exist on the facts
presented.
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no longer evident that the rule produces the result that it seeks: the
avoidance of relitigation and its attendant costs. 75 Relitigation is un-
likely in negative-value cases and in cases in which there are few for-
eign forums that both decline to recognize the American outcome
and have cost-effective mechanisms for compensating mass injuries.
Thus, even if a foreign citizen's home country refuses to recognize an
American class judgment or settlement, excluding this citizen from
the American class action makes little sense when the expected per-
capita benefit from foreign litigation is low and the expected per-cap-
ita cost of litigating in a nonrecognizing forum is high (i.e., the nega-
tive-value condition). Conversely, including foreign citizens from
recognizing countries makes little sense when the foreign citizens' in-
dividual cases have positive value and a nonrecognizing country has a
cost-effective forum to resolve these cases on an individual or group
basis.76 Yet the Bersch-Vivendi rule calls for this result in both
situations.
The structure of American class actions and the posture of mass-
aggregation devices elsewhere in the world further undermine the
Bersch-Vivendi rule. Today American courts often decline to certify
class actions when the claims are independently viable; in particular,
federal courts have tended to restrict the use of Rule 23 to negative-
value or small-value suits of the kind for which the Bersch-Vivendi ap-
proach is least effective. 77 At the same time, although the number of
foreign countries with collective-action processes is growing (thus ex-
panding the number of cost-effective foreign forums in which ex-
cluded citizens can file) ,7 countries with collective-action processes
are likely to recognize an American class judgment or settlement.79
The combination of these two realities means that the Bersch-Vivendi
rule principally operates to exclude the foreign citizens least likely to
relitigate and most in need of an effective American remedy.
Indeed, both Bersch and Vivendi were securities fraud actions,
which typically involve small stakes for most investors and are there-
75 Cf Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 996 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting the
policy concern of relitigation as a reason for disallowing foreign citizens to join domestic
class suits).
76 Harder cases lie in the middle: when either the foreign citizens' cases have positive
value or there are hospitable and cost-effective foreign forums, but not both.
77 For federal cases declining to certify mass torts in part because they were positive-
value suits and in part because their value put inordinate pressure on the defendant to
settle, see, for example, Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748-49 (5th Cir. 1996);
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299-1300 (7th Cir. 1995).
78 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
79 See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 242 F.R.D. 76, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (not-
ing that the Netherlands' recent enactment of its WCAM procedure made it likely that it
would recognize an American class judgment).
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fore ideally suited to class treatment under Rule 23.80 Neither Bersch
nor Vivendi suggested that nonrecognizing countries had cost-effective
processes for aggregating and resolving the claims of excluded share-
holders. 8 ' In neither case, therefore, was significant relitigation in
nonrecognizing forums likely to occur-even if the American class ac-
tion yielded a disappointing outcome for foreign citizens. As a result,
the costs of relitigation that Bersch and Vivendi avoided were probably
less than the undercompensation and underdeterrence that exclud-
ing foreign class members caused.
Another real-world dynamic makes the Bersch-Vivendi approach
even more problematic. The relitigation that the Bersch-Vivendi rule
seeks to avoid is most likely to occur when the American class judg-
ment or settlement gives foreign citizens less relief than was ex-
pected.8 2 Such cases, however, would usually be classified as weak-
they fail to yield the expected benefit. As a practical matter, the loser-
pay rule that foreign tribunals employ83 creates a disincentive to file
weak claims.84 Therefore, the feared relitigation that the Bersch-
Vivendi approach sought to stanch is unlikely to materialize in prac-
tice, while the costs of failing to compensate or undercompensating
excluded foreign citizens loom large.
IV
BEYOND BERSCH AND VIVENDI: BENEFITS AND COSTS OF
OTHER APPROACHES
Given the costs of the Bersch-Vivendi rule, we now consider
whether other options are less costly. We analyze five contenders: a
rule allowing the inclusion of all foreign citizens (the inclusion rule);
a rule that excludes all foreign citizens (the exclusion rule); a rule
80 See id. at 92 ("In a case such as this, where each individual plaintiff can only have a
fraction of the interest in the outcome of the litigation as the defendants, any interest the
members of the class might have in individually controlling the prosecution of separate
actions is heavily outweighed by the obvious benefits of pressing their claims as a class.").
81 Indeed, Vivendi conceded the opposite with respect to Germany, in which "collec-
tive actions remain unknown." Id. at 104-05. Rather than relying on this fact as a reason
to include German class members, however, the court used it as a reason to exclude these
members-likely meaning that German shareholders received no redress for Vivendi's al-
legedly unlawful behavior.
82 Recall that, in many cases in which foreign claimants possess claims of greater value
in a foreign forum, they will be excluded from the American class action on superiority
grounds. See supra notes 43-46, 49 and accompanying text.
83 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
84 For an economic analysis demonstrating this intuitive point, see Barbara Luppi &
Francesco Parisi, Litigation and Legal Evolution: Does Procedure Matter? 18-20 (Univ. of Minn.
Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-09, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1555784. For a discussion of empirical evidence on fee
shifting, see Avery Wiener Katz & Chris William Sanchirico, Fee Shifting in Litigation: Survey
and Assessment 25-34 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 10-
30, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1714089.
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that excludes foreign citizens with an incentive to relitigate in a for-
eign forum (the incentive rule); relatedly, a rule that excludes foreign
citizens who can be expected to have an incentive to relitigate (the
expected-incentive rule); and a rule that mimics a foreign citizen's
decision whether to opt out (the forced opt-out rule). We examine
each rule in light of the five benefits and eight costs that we identified
in evaluating the Bersch-Vivendi rule.
A. The Inclusion Rule
A rule including all foreign citizens who otherwise meet the crite-
ria of Rule 2385 can yield the first two benefits identified in our discus-
sion of the Bersch-Vivendi rule: compensation in an American forum
and avoidance of excess litigation costs that would have arisen in the
foreign forum.8 6 Because no foreign citizens are excluded, however,
this rule does not yield the third through fifth benefits, which mea-
sure the gains that accrue as a result of excluding some foreign
citizens.8
7
On the cost side, the inclusion rule avoids the four costs of exclu-
sion as well as the fifth cost of administering the rule.88 But the three
costs of inclusion-the two costs that arise because of the possibility of
relitigation 9 and the third cost that arises when included citizens
might have been better compensated in a foreign forum9°-remain.
Indeed, these three costs are likely to be greater under the inclusion
approach than under the Bersch-Vivendi approach because the inclu-
sion of a greater number of foreign citizens in the American case in-
85 Rejecting the Bersch-Vivendi approach does not mean that all foreign citizens would
therefore become class members. Other requirements of Rules 23(a) and (b) might re-
quire exclusion of some foreign citizens. See supra notes 7, 47-49 and accompanying text.
86 See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. Realization of the second of these
benefits is contingent on the relative cost-effectiveness of the American class action.
87 See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. The sentence in the text is a slight
overstatement. Because included foreign claimants typically have the right to opt out of
the American class action, see supra note 14, the inclusion rule still realizes the third
through fifth benefits for those citizens who opt out. Typically, however, few class mem-
bers opt out. See THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS
ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRuCr COURTS 52-53 (1996) (noting a median opt-out rate of
0.1% or 0.2% of the total class membership in a study of federal class actions). The opt-out
rate will likely be even lower for foreign citizens because of the considerable difficulty of
supplying foreign citizens with an effective notice of their right to opt out. See supra note
47 and accompanying text. The incentive for foreign citizens to opt out is especially weak
if they can lurk in the American class action and see what it yields, while retaining the
option to file a later case for additional recovery in a nonrecognizing foreign forum.
88 See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. Again, because claimants may opt
out, the text in the sentence is not precisely accurate. Given that the number who opt out
is likely to be inconsequential and that these claimants also generate certain benefits, see
supra note 87 and accompanying text, we treat the benefits and costs of opting out as a
wash.
89 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
90 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 97:87
2011] FOREIGN CITIZENS IN TRANSNA TIONAL CLASS ACTIONS 113
creases the chance that some foreign claimants will be dissatisfied and
will commence a subsequent foreign proceeding.
The inclusion rule's ability to deliver a level of compensation for
all foreign citizens and to eliminate most of the categories of cost asso-
ciated with the Bersch-Vivendi rule makes the inclusion rule sound like
a clearly superior alternative. Not necessarily. In readily imaginable
circumstances-for instance, when every foreign citizen has a claim in
a foreign tribunal whose value exceeds the value of the claim in the
American class action and further has ready access to a nonrecdgniz-
ing foreign forum with a cost-effective mass-aggregation device-the
Bersch-Vivendi rule is more efficient. The reason is that the Bersch-
Vivendi rule limits sure-to-be-incurred relitigation costs and allows ex-
cluded foreign citizens to realize the full value of their claim overseas.
Nonetheless, if the only choice was either to adopt the Bersch-
Vivendi approach or to reject it in favor of the inclusion rule, the
Bersch-Vivendi approach performs worse over a broader range of situa-
tions. The present law on American class actions, which favors certifi-
cation only in cases of small value, 9 1 tips the scale against the Bersch-
Vivendi rule; small-stakes cases are less likely to result in subsequent
litigation, thus limiting the downside relitigation costs of the inclusion
rule. So do the loser-pay rules of foreign legal systems and the likeli-
hood that foreign countries with effective mass-aggregation rules will
recognize the American judgment or settlement.92 In making this ar-
gument, we are sensitive to the reality that rejecting the Bersch-Vivendi
rule will result in relitigation, with all of its attendant costs. But the
flip-side costs of the Bersch-Vivendi rule-especially undercompensa-
tion and underdeterrence in the small-stakes cases that are standard
fare for American class actions-are generally greater.
The choice of rule, however, is not binary; we need not accept the
Bersch-Vivendi approach in toto or reject any exclusion of foreign citi-
zens. Other rules are possible.
B. The Exclusion Rule
The rule opposite to a rule automatically including all foreign
citizens who meet the terms of Rule 23 is a rule excluding all foreign
citizens even when they meet the terms of Rule 23. The benefits and
costs of this exclusion rule are the mirror images of those for the in-
clusion rule. Because all foreign citizens are excluded, no citizens re-
ceive any benefits from the American class action; hence, neither of
the first two benefits is realized. 93 On the other hand, for those for-
eign citizens with an incentive to sue, the third and fourth benefits,
91 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
92 See supra notes 78-79, 83-84 and accompanying text.
93 See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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which arise from compensation these foreign citizens receive in a for-
eign forum and the avoidance of unnecessary costs from the Ameri-
can class action, are realized; and for those foreign citizens who lack
an incentive to sue and whose claims were meritless, the fifth benefit is
also realized. 94
On the cost side, because all foreign citizens are excluded, none
of the first three costs arises-including, most significantly, the costs
associated with relitigation in a foreign forum.9 5 Nor does the final
cost-the administrative cost of determining which citizens to include
and which to exclude. 96 But the fourth through the seventh costs,
especially the failure to compensate foreign citizens with no incentive
to file overseas and the loss to the American citizens remaining in the
American class action from a suboptimal class, are a greater
concern.
97
Aside from its administrative simplicity (a benefit it shares with
the inclusion rule), the exclusion rule appears to be an unattractive
alternative. Recall that some foreign citizens with an incentive to sue
have already been excluded from the class on superiority grounds.98
The exclusion rule banishes the remainder-those whose presence in
the class adds more expected value to the class than the expected
value they would obtain from proceeding in a foreign forum. In do-
ing so, we devalue the claims of the American citizens remaining in
the class action more than the foreign citizens gain in their foreign
cases. In addition, the exclusion rule incurs the cost of failing to de-
liver any compensation to those foreign citizens who lack an incentive
to pursue a foreign claim. Therefore, unless the risk of relitigation is
high and the costs of that relitigation are large, the costs for the re-
maining American members and for the uncompensated foreign
members make the exclusion rule difficult to justify.
The chances of relitigation are greatest when the American class
action so strongly disappoints foreign citizens that they have an incen-
tive to file a subsequent foreign proceeding. The quintessential exam-
ple occurs when the class loses the American case. Due to the
operation of loser-pay rules in foreign forums and the vagaries of find-
ing a hospitable foreign tribunal,99 however, it is not true that even a
disappointing American result will necessarily unleash a torrent of for-
eign relitigation. Nor is it true that every American class action will
94 See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
95 See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
96 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
97 See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
98 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
99 See supra notes 78-79, 83-84 and accompanying text.
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reach a disappointing result; indeed, it is a rare criticism of American
class actions that they systematically underdeliver a remedy.
10 0
The exclusion rule suffers from other problems as well. To be-
gin, there are obvious problems of comity when American courts close
their doors to foreigners simply by virtue of their citizenship. Next,
closing the doors of federal courthouses to foreign citizens is inconsis-
tent with the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, in which Congress
authorized federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over a class action
when "any member of a class of plaintiffs is... a citizen or subject of a
foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a State." 0 1 No Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure, including Rule 23, can "limit the jurisdiction
of the district courts."10 2
While intolerably overbroad, the exclusion rule, like the Bersch-
Vivendi rule, points toward the right idea: exclude those foreign citi-
zens likely to commence a foreign proceeding. The following three
sections examine other rules that seek to implement this insight.
C. The Incentive Rule
An immediately attractive possibility is to exclude from the Amer-
ican class those foreign citizens who have an incentive to file subse-
quent foreign litigation but include foreign citizens who lack an
incentive to litigate subsequently. 10 3 Like the Bersch-Vivendi rule, this
100 The usual concern with class actions is the opposite: that they use the power of
large numbers to convert weak claims into litigation juggernauts that defendants must set-
tle at an inflated price. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
130 S. Ct. 1431, 1465 n.3 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("A court's decision to certify a
class accordingly places pressure on the defendant to settle even unmeritorious claims.");
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.) (issuing a
writ of mandamus against an order certifying a class action in part because of "a concern
with forcing these defendants to stake their companies on the outcome of a single jury
trial, or be forced by fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle even if they have no legal
liability").
101 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2) (B) (2006). By virtue of the generous jurisdictional and
removal provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act, see id. §§ 1332(d)(2)-(4), 1453(b),
most class actions involving foreign citizens are likely to land in federal court.
102 FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
103 Again, we assume that the included citizens otherwise meet the requirements of
Rule 23 or the comparable state-court rule. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. For
an extended discussion of the circumstances under which foreign citizens have incentive to
file subsequent foreign litigation, see supra Part IIC. In brief, a court should include any
foreign citizen s when
X(s) > PNX P(S)Fx L(S)F- C(S)F
and exclude any foreign citizen t when
PNX P(t)F x L(I)F- C(t)F> X(t).
See supra note 56 (discussing this formula in detail). The group of foreign citizens S is the
combination of the groups of foreign citizens H and R in our prior analysis. See supra notes
59, 63 and accompanying text. The group of foreign citizens T is the combination of
groups of foreign citizens J and Q See supra notes 59, 61 and accompanying text.
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rule includes some foreign citizens and excludes others. But the
groups of foreign citizens included and excluded are different.
Rather than focusing on the legal status of an American judgment in a
foreign citizen's home country, this rule focuses on the incentive that
foreign litigants have to relitigate in a foreign forum.
Like every rule including some class members and excluding
others, this incentive rule has benefits and costs. Mapping the five
benefits and eight costs onto this rule,10 4 the incentive rule potentially
realizes all five benefits: compensation to every victim as well as possi-
ble savings from avoided litigation expenses (depending on the com-
parative costliness of the American and foreign proceedings and the
number of excluded citizens whose claims are ultimately found to lack
merit in a foreign proceeding).
On the cost side, the picture is more complicated. None of the
first six costs arises. The first and second costs, which occur when
included foreign citizens who are dissatisfied with the American class
judgment or settlement relitigate, do not arise; by definition, the in-
cluded foreign citizens obtain more from the American case than they
expect to receive overseas, and therefore will not sue again. The same
is true of the third cost, which arises only when included citizens
could have obtained more compensation in a foreign action. As long
as the American class action results in an actual gross benefit to in-
cluded foreign class members that equals or exceeds the expected net
benefit from a subsequently available foreign proceeding, none of
these three costs associated with relitigation occur.10 5
Similarly, because every foreign citizen now has an incentive to
bring or participate in an action in some forum (those with an incen-
tive to sue in a foreign forum will sue overseas, and those without an
incentive will remain members of the American class action), the
fourth, fifth, and sixth costs-all of which occur when excluded class
members fail to recover the appropriate, less costly compensation that
the American class action could have delivered-do not arise.
On the other hand, under the incentive rule, the seventh cost-
the diminution in value of the American class action after exclusion of
certain foreign citizens-is in play. Because this rule excludes valua-
ble claims (claims that are worth even more overseas than they are in
an American court), the chance of a collapse in the value of the Amer-
ican class action is higher under this rule than under the Bersch-
104 See supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text.
105 An exception to this statement involves foreign citizens who are risk takers and who
are therefore unduly optimistic about their chances to recover more in subsequent foreign
proceedings than they obtained in the American classjudgment or settlement. For these
class members, the second cost is in play, and possibly the first if the gamble pays off with a
higher foreign judgment. Previously we assumed risk neutrality. See supra note 24.
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Vivendi rule. Unless exclusion of the foreign claims completely sub-
marines the value of the American class action, however, it seems un-
likely that this cost outweighs the benefits of the incentive rule.
As attractive as the incentive rule thus far appears, the eighth
cost-the administrability of the incentive rule-imposes a nearly in-
superable barrier. Because nonrecognition is a relevant variable in
calculating the expected net benefit of a foreign proceeding, courts
must incur the expense of determining whether foreign forums will
recognize an American class judgment or settlement, as they do under
the Bersch-Vivendi rule. 10 6 In addition, the court bears the burden of
determining the expected value of foreign citizens' claims in a foreign
forum-a calculation that requires an American court to learn about
the law and the costs associated with every nonrecognizing foreign
system, and then to learn enough about the facts of the case to make
an educated guess about foreign citizens' expected outcome in each
system.
But this is not all. The critical value in the incentive rule is the
gross payoff of the American class action to each foreign class mem-
ber; this value is the fulcrum point that separates those who should be
included and those who should be excluded. 10 7 But this amount will
be known at the time of class certification only in rare cases. 10 8 The
incentive rule demands the impossible of an American court: before
the court certifies the class, it must predict perfectly how much com-
pensation each foreign claimant will receive after the completion of
the American action.10 9
106 In actuality, the cost is slightly different under the two rules. Under the Bersch-
Vivendi rule, a court needs to determine whether each foreign citizen's home country will
(or will not) recognize the American result. Under the incentive rule, the court must
determine whether any foreign country will not recognize the American result and then
factor in the cost to foreign citizens of suing in that forum. Although the latter inquiry is
probably easier and less expensive to accomplish, we treat this cost as a wash when compar-
ing the Bersch-Vivendi rule and the incentive rule.
107 We previously designated this point with the variable X See supra text accompany-
ing notes 50-51.
108 For instance, in some settlement class actions the value of the benefit to each class
member is known at the time that the class is certified. But such cases are rare. In the first
place, settlement class actions are difficult to certify. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527
U.S. 815, 848-61 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619-29 (1997). In
the second place, even when certification is possible, the settlement agreement often does
not specify the exact benefit that a class member receives; the settlement often establishes
schedules or criteria for compensation that require subsequent individualized application.
See, e.g., JAY TIDMARSH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MAss TORT SETrLEMENT CLAss AcrIONS: FIvE
CASE STUDIES 76 & n.191, 79-83 (1998) (describing a worldwide mass-tort settlement class
action in which class members were scheduled to receive different levels of compensation
based on numerous factors).
109 A related difficulty is the implicit requirement of Rule 23 (a) that a class be defined
with sufficient specificity that the parties and court can determine who must receive notice
of the right to opt out and who will be bound by the judgment. Bratcher v. Nat'l Std. Life
Ins. Co. (In re Monumental Life Ins. Co.), 365 F.3d 408, 413 (11th Cir. 2004). Under the
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Despite this fatal flaw, it is worth returning to the basic point of
the incentive rule. In theory, it is in most circumstances the least
costly rule for deciding whether to include foreign citizens in Ameri-
can class actions. It reaps all the benefits of proper inclusion and ex-
clusion, and it imposes only the seventh and eighth costs. Therefore,
in theory, it is far superior to the Bersch-Vivendi rule, the inclusion rule,
and the exclusion rule. The problem with the rule is an informational
demand that renders the rule unusable in most real-world situations.
Because the incentive rule holds such promise, however, it is worth
considering whether the rule can be tweaked in a way that accounts
for the near impossibility of knowing in advance what the American
class action will in fact yield for foreign citizens. The following section
considers two rules designed to do so.
D. Ex Ante Alternatives: The Expected-Incentive Rule and the
Forced Opt-Out Rule
The evident solution to minimize the informational barrier in the
incentive rule is to substitute for the actual gross benefit that the
American class action will bestow on foreign citizens another term
that is as close to this benefit as possible and is knowable at the time of
the class-certification decision. As an economic matter, there are two
logical substitutes, both of which substitute for the actual (or ex post)
gross benefit an expected (or ex ante) benefit. The first is the ex-
pected gross benefit that a foreign class member will receive. 110
Under this "expected-incentive rule," an American court should in-
clude foreign citizens for whom the expected gross benefit of the
American class action is greater than or equal to the expected net
benefit of the foreign proceeding; it should exclude those foreign citi-
zens for whom the expected net benefit of the foreign proceeding is
greater than the expected gross benefit of the American class
action."'l
incentive rule, a court's order defining the class would need to contain language along the
lines of this: "Class membership extends only to those foreign citizens who will receive
more from this class action than they expect to receive as a net benefit in a foreign pro-
ceeding." Depending as it does on subsequent contingencies, such a class definition may
be too vague to satisfy Rule 23(a). See Rice v. City of Phila., 66 F.R.D. 17, 20-22 (E.D. Pa.
1974) (refusing to certify a damages class action when the class definition swept presently
unknowable future class members into the class).
110 If we let PcA represent the probability of winning a class action and LcA represent
the value of the recovery to the plaintiff if the class action succeeds, the expected gross
benefit for class member i is P(z)cA x L(i)c4, or EGB(i)cA.
111 Thus, if EGBA represents the expected gross benefit of an American class action
and ENBF represents the expected net benefit of a foreign proceeding, a court should
include any foreign citizen u for whom EGB(u)cA = ENB(u)F is true, and exclude any for-
eign citizen v for whom ENB(V)F > EGB(v)cA is true.
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The second substitute is the expected net benefit that a foreign
class member will receive in the American class action.1 12 This
"forced opt-out rule" changes the first term in the equation, so that
only those foreign citizens for whom the net (as opposed to gross)
expected benefit of the American class action exceeds the expected
net benefit of a foreign proceeding remain in the American class.113
In theory, the expected-incentive rule is superior to the forced
opt-out rule because the expected gross benefit more closely tracks
the actual gross benefit of the (theoretically) ideal incentive rule. The
expected-incentive rule also eliminates the need for the court to cal-
culate the cost of the American class action-a calculation that the
expected net benefit requires.1 1 4 But the forced opt-out rule has one
advantage: it mimics the opt-out decision that fully informed, wealth-
maximizing foreign citizens would make. Such citizens would calcu-
late their expected net recovery in the American class action and their
expected net recovery in a foreign proceeding. They would then
choose the proceeding that yielded the greatest benefit to them. 115
Because some foreign class members might not be fully informed, and
others might lurk in the American class action with the knowledge
that an available foreign forum will not recognize the American class
judgment or settlement, there is no guarantee that foreign citizens
will opt out as rational actors might. The forced opt-out rule effec-
tively "opts out" these citizens, avoiding some of the costs associated
with lack of information or strategic behavior.
In terms of the benefits and costs of the expected-incentive rule,
they map fairly well onto the benefits and costs of the incentive
rule. 116 Indeed, if the court accurately estimates the exact recovery
that foreign claimants later receive, the expected-incentive rule reaps
all the benefits of the incentive rule and imposes only the seventh cost
112 The expected net benefit for class member i is P(i)cA x L(i) c - C()cA, or ENB(O A.
See supra note 29 for an explanation of this calculation.
113 Thus, a court should include any foreign citizen a for whom ENB(a)cA = ENB(a)Fis
true, and exclude any foreign citizens b for whom ENB(b)F> ENB(b)c is true.
114 For the formula calculating the expected net benefit, see supra notes 29, 112.
115 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
116 The expected-incentive rule is not perfect in this regard. In choosing to stay in or
opt out of the American class action, a fully informed, wealth-maximizing foreign citizen
without the safe harbor of a nonrecognizing foreign forum would compare net benefits of
the American class action to net benefits of the foreign proceeding. The expected-incen-
tive rule compares gross American benefits to net foreign benefits because of the fact that
a foreign court will set off the gross proceeds, not the net proceeds, in the subsequent
foreign litigation. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. Therefore, foreign citizens
will not commence subsequent foreign proceedings unless they can net more than the
American gross. In excluding only those foreign citizens expected to net more overseas
than they are expected to gross in the American class action, the expected-incentive rule
therefore contains a slight bias in favor of inclusion. As a result, the number of possible
dissatisfied foreign citizens rises, and the chance of relitigation and undercompensation
increases.
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(the loss in value to the remaining class members from the exclusion
of some of their number) and the eighth cost (the expense of ad-
ministering the expected-incentive rule-principally, the cost of ob-
taining the information to calculate the expected gross benefit in the
American case and the expected net benefit in the foreign
proceeding).
But the likelihood of perfect estimation is very low. The Ameri-
can court is likely to overestimate the recovery in the American class
action for some foreign citizens, and to underestimate it for others.
Both overestimation and underestimation reduce the benefits of the
expected-incentive rule and impose costs. In general terms, overesti-
mating the benefit that foreign class members would receive in the
American case increases the likelihood of foreign relitigation. Con-
versely, underestimating the benefit excludes from the class action
some foreign citizens who would have received greater net compensa-
tion in the American case. Significantly, however, underestimating
the American recovery still provides foreign citizens with some oppor-
tunity for recovery in either an American or a foreign proceeding 117 -
an important contrast to the Bersch-Vivendi rule.
A similar but not identical analysis pertains to the forced opt-out
rule. Because it uses the expected net benefit, which is a lower num-
ber than the expected gross benefit, using the forced opt-out rule
leads to the exclusion of more foreign citizens than using the ex-
pected-incentive rule. As a result, in relation to the expected-incen-
tive rule, the forced opt-out rule reduces the risk of relitigation and its
attendant costs, but increases the risk of undercompensation of for-
eign citizens and its attendant costs. This is true even if the American
court perfectly predicts the expected net benefit; to include and ex-
clude the "right" foreign citizens (i.e., the citizens that the incentive
rule would include and exclude), a court applying the forced opt-out
rule would need to overestimate, rather than correctly estimate, the
expected net benefit.'18
Therefore, in comparing the expected-incentive rule to the
forced opt-out rule, the expected-incentive rule performs better than
the forced opt-out rule when a judge can estimate the expected gross
117 Recall that the American class action must have a nonnegative expected net value
for each class member. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Therefore, the expected
gross value of the American class action will be a positive number, and the American class
action will exclude only those foreign citizens whose expected net benefit in a foreign
proceeding is even greater than this number. Hence, foreign citizens will either remain in
the American class or have an incentive to pursue their claims overseas.
118 The reason is that, to match the incentive rule, the expected net benefit would
need to match the actual gross recovery (i.e., ENBc4 = X). Because the expected net bene-
fit subtracts expected costs of litigation, while the actual gross benefit does not subtract the
actual costs of litigation, the two terms will be equal only if a court overestimates the ex-
pected gross benefit.
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benefit with some accuracy. The expected-incentive rule also per-
forms better as a judge's likelihood of underestimating the American
recovery increases. Conversely, the forced opt-out rule performs bet-
ter as a judge's likelihood of overestimating the American recovery
increases.
Both rules, however, suffer from the significant practical draw-
backs of the incentive rule. For both rules, if their operation results in
the exclusion of some foreign citizens, the seventh cost (the loss in
value to the remaining American class members) is an issue. 119 More
important, the eighth cost (the cost of administering the rule) again
rears its head. Unlike the incentive rule, no variable is impossible to
calculate, 120 but like the incentive rule, the calculation of the variables
needed to make a fairly accurate assessment of the citizens to include
and exclude requires courts to have information about the likelihood
and amount of recoveries in both American and foreign proceedings,
and (for the forced opt-out rule) about the costs of the American liti-
gation as well. Because a court is not likely to have the full informa-
tion necessary to make its calculations accurately, the risk of error is
high.1 2 1
It is tempting to argue that the error costs in administering either
of the ex ante rules will balance themselves out over time: because
there will be too much inclusion in some cases and too much exclu-
sion in others, the soundest strategy is for courts to pick one of the ex
ante rules (likely the expected-incentive rule, because it more closely
replicates the incentive rule and is less fraught with error) and stick
with it. But that argument will not do. In the first instance, costs
might be systematically skewed in one direction. Second, and relat-
edly, the rule that proves more costly might change over time. For
instance, if American courts generally certify only small-stakes cases,
and if there are no cost-effective nonrecognizing foreign forums, then
the rule that errs on the side of including more foreign class members
(i.e., the expected-incentive rule) will typically increase benefits and
119 Both ex ante rules alter the ordinary concept of superiority. Usually, superiority
requires that the class action be superior (in other words, yield the greatest expected net
benefit) for the class as a whole. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. The ex-
pected-incentive rule excludes putative class members who impose a high risk of relitigat-
ing in nonrecognizing foreign forums, even if their exclusion is not optimal for the
American class action as a whole. But this loss to the American class might be necessary to
reduce the costs associated with foreign relitigation and with certain forms of
undercompensation.
120 Under the incentive rule the actual gross benefit is usually impossible to calculate
at the time of class certification. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
121 For one example of a case in which the district court badly misjudged the likely
recovery and the expected attorneys' fees, see In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 241,
280-86 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that the district judge, in selecting lead counsel based on
fee structure, badly underestimated the value of the ultimate settlement, which was $3.2
billion rather than the millions that the district judge anticipated).
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reduce costs. But circumstances can change. Perhaps changes in the
underlying law will make foreign citizens' cases more valuable, or cost-
effective nonrecognizing foreign forums will spring up. At that point,
a rule erring on the side of exclusion (i.e., the forced opt-out rule)
might be better. Picking a single rule fails to account for the reality
that the evolution of collective-action processes-both in the United
States and overseas-remains fluid, as does the nature of the claims
that might be asserted in these processes.
E. Summary
The discussion in the last two Parts reveals three points of signifi-
cance. First, as long as foreign forums that do not recognize an Amer-
ican class judgment or settlement exist, and as long as some foreign
forums might yield greater net recoveries for some foreign citizens
than the American class action, the decision regarding foreign citi-
zens' membership in an American class action imposes costs (even as
it also generates benefits). Some costs arise from inclusion; others
arise from exclusion. Therefore, when a defendant's wrongful actions
toward large numbers of victims reach across national borders, no de-
cision to include or exclude foreign citizens in a class action-regard-
less of what that decision is-is costless. 122
Second, assuming that we wish to minimize the costs (or, con-
versely, maximize the benefits) of foreign citizens' membership in the
American class action, no rule regarding the inclusion or exclusion of
foreign citizens is optimal for all circumstances. In some cases (when
no foreign citizen has a claim worth relitigating), including all foreign
citizens is least costly. In some cases (when all foreign citizens have
claims worth relitigating and a nonrecognizing foreign forum in
which to proceed), excluding all foreign citizens might be the best
way to go, although the answer still depends on the effect of exclusion
on the value of the American class action. No single rule adequately
captures the range of factual variations on which the choice of the
least costly rule depends. The incentive rule does the best job in the-
ory, but its practical difficulties make the incentive rule impossible to
adopt in most real-world settings.
Third, the Bersch-Vivendi rule is not the least costly rule, especially
in light of the present structure of Rule 23 and the evolving state of
collective-action processes overseas. It overemphasizes the costs of re-
litigation (some of which will materialize anyway), and it undervalues
the loss of compensation to excluded citizens. For that reason, the
122 If we alter the assumptions at the start of this paragraph-so that all foreign forums
will recognize the American class judgment or settlement and no greater compensation is
ever available in a foreign forum-then a rule automatically including foreign citizens is
costless. But on the realistic assumptions above, every rule is indeed costly.
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rule should be rejected. But it is difficult to reject an established rule
when no other rule emerges as clearly superior; and, as we have seen,
no rule is clearly superior in all situations.
Although no single rule always performs best, the past two Parts
reveal that certain factors are relevant in analyzing the benefits and
costs of various alternative rules. This fact suggests that the best way to
handle foreign citizens' membership in American class actions might
not be a rule, but rather a multifactor standard. The next Part devel-
ops such an approach.
V
PRESUMPTIVE RULES FOR CLASS MEMBERSHIP
As this analysis has emphasized, any approach to the inclusion or
exclusion of foreign citizens must begin by considering the incentive
that foreign citizens do, or do not, have to relitigate in a foreign fo-
rum. If foreign citizens have an incentive to relitigate, then their in-
clusion generates costs that can be avoided by their exclusion; 123 on
the other hand, if foreign citizens have no incentive to relitigate, the
feared costs will not materialize, and problems of undercompensation
and underdeterrence arise. 124 In either event, the starting point for
determining the benefits and costs of various rules for inclusion or
exclusion is the incentive to litigate. In determining this incentive,
the factors include the stakes of the litigation, the existence of foreign
forums that will not recognize the American class judgment or settle-
ment, the likelihood of recovery in such foreign forums, the capacity
of such forums to resolve efficiently the claims presented to it, and the
likelihood and efficiency of the American class action to achieve a re-
covery for included foreign citizens. 125
In addition to the incentive to litigate, two other factors have also
emerged as significant in evaluating various alternatives for inclusion
and exclusion. The first is the effect of excluding some foreign citi-
zens on the value of the claims of those remaining in the American
class action. If the costs associated with relitigation are low, and if the
value of the American class action for remaining class members will
collapse without those foreign citizens who might relitigate, there is
reason to include the foreign citizens in the class despite the costs
associated with relitigation. Conversely, if the costs of relitigation are
high, and the exclusion of foreign citizens with an incentive to litigate
123 As we have shown, the costs associated with relitigation are broader than the addi-
tional litigation expenses of a second lawsuit. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying
text.
124 See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
125 See supra Part II.C.
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has little effect on the value of the remaining claims, exclusion is
more likely to be appropriate.
Third, the administrability of a rule is critical. The "ideal" rule
(i.e., the rule that minimizes costs in most circumstances) is the incen-
tive rule, but it is practical only when the benefits of the American
class action are known and the expected benefits of a foreign proceed-
ing are easily ascertained. 12 6 Similar practical problems infested ex
ante rules designed to mimic the incentive rule. 12 7 As we have seen,
flat rules with no or low costs of administration-the inclusion rule,
the exclusion rule, and even the Bersch-Vivendi rule (although here the
costs of administration are not negligible128 ) -have other costs that
make them undesirable as a general rule for foreign class member-
ship. But they do enjoy an advantage that has turned out to be signifi-
cant in this area: simplicity. 1 29
Taking these factors into account, we propose that American
courts determine the status of foreign citizens in American class ac-
tions through a series of steps that are simple to administer and ap-
proximate the results that an incentive rule would achieve:
1. A court should presumptively include foreign citizens when
they assert small-stakes claims (i.e., claims that would not be via-
ble in an American court if pursued individually).
2. A defendant can overcome the presumption of inclusion by
identifying foreign citizens for whom there exist one or more
foreign forums (including arbitral forums) that:
a. Are open to these citizens;
b. Do not recognize an American class judgment or
settlement;
c. Provide cost-effective procedures for resolving small-stakes
cases; and
d. Employ rules of substantive, procedural, or remedial law
that are likely to result in a more favorable outcome for the
foreign citizens than the rules employed in the American
court will produce.
3. The court can nonetheless include those foreign citizens who
meet the criteria in (2) when:
a. The foreign citizens expressly consent to be bound by the
American class judgment or settlement; or
b. The foreign citizens are unlikely to pursue their claims in
the identified foreign forum(s), and the expected loss in
value in the American class action from the exclusion of
these citizens outweighs the expected costs of relitigation if
these citizens are included.
126 See supra Part IV.C.
127 See supra Part IV.D.
128 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
129 See supra Parts III, V.A, 1V.B.
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4. The court should presumptively exclude foreign citizens whose
claims would be viable as individual suits in an American court.
The class representative(s) can overcome this presumption for
some or all foreign citizens by showing that:
a. The foreign citizens expressly consent to be bound by the
American class judgment or settlement; or
b. No foreign forum open to those citizens will refuse to rec-
ognize the American class judgment or settlement.
At the most basic level, these presumptions divide small-stakes
cases from large-stakes cases. The reason is simple. The principal
concern driving the exclusion of foreign citizens is the fear of relitiga-
tion. 0 Relitigation is more likely when the claims are valuable
enough to pursue in a foreign forum. Therefore, we begin with a
presumption that claims valuable enough to bring independently in
an American court should be excluded, because these are the cases
for which there exists an evident incentive to relitigate in the event of
an unfavorable American judgment or settlement. Conversely, we be-
gin with the presumption that cases too small to bring independently
in an American court are also too small to bring in a foreign forum.
The lack of an incentive to relitigate eliminates concern for incurring
relitigation costs. On the other hand, the exclusion of these claims
from the American class action causes the undercompensation of
these foreign citizens.
Both presumptions-the presumption of including small-stakes
foreign claims and the presumption of excluding large-stakes foreign
claims-are rebuttable. Defendants can overcome the presumption
to include small-stakes foreign claims by pointing to one or more spe-
cific foreign forums that are "hospitable" to these claims. Hos-
pitability first requires a showing that the foreign forum will be able to
hear the claims (i.e., jurisdictional, venue, and comity concerns pose
no barrier to resolving the claims). It also requires a showing that the
foreign forum has a collective-action mechanism akin to the American
class action; if it does not, there is little realistic chance that the small-
stakes cases will in fact be relitigated.
Relatedly, hospitability requires that the foreign forum's substan-
tive, procedural, or remedial rules provide an incentive to relitigate.
Because the claims are small-stakes in nature, there is no incentive to
relitigate them in a foreign forum unless the rules of the foreign fo-
rum provide some advantage unavailable in the American case (e.g.,
they are more cost-effective to bring on a collective basis or foreign
law makes them large enough in size that, although regarded as small-
130 Cf Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 996 (2d Cir. 1975) (identifying
the potential problem of relitigation as the motivation for excluding foreign citizens from
domestic class actions).
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stakes cases in the United States, they are large-stakes cases in the for-
eign forum). If the substantive law, procedures, and remedies are ba-
sically the same as they are in the American class action, the American
court can logically conclude that the expected outcome in the two
proceedings (the American and the foreign) would be comparable; in
this case, there is little likelihood that relitigation will occur.
Finally, hospitability also requires a demonstration that any iden-
tified foreign forums meeting the other criteria will not recognize the
American judgment. To this limited extent, the concern for nonrec-
ognition that underlies the Bersch-Vivendi rule affects the proper ap-
proach to inclusion and exclusion of foreign citizens.
Our expectation is that defendants will rarely overcome the pre-
sumption favoring inclusion of small-stakes foreign claims. As we have
said, most foreign forums with cost-effective collective-action
processes are also likely to recognize an American class judgment or
settlement.1 31 In the event that the defendants succeed, however, the
pendulum swings back in favor of exclusion because of the high risk
of relitigation. The third step, however, describes two circumstances
in which the court can decline to exclude foreign citizens despite this
risk.
The first circumstance (step 3(a)) raises the possibility that for-
eign citizens might consent to be bound by the American judgment.
Consent is a factor strongly favoring inclusion in the American ac-
tion, 132 but it is unlikely that, in small-stakes cases, many foreign plain-
tiffs will provide consent.
The second circumstance (step 3(b)) calls attention to the reality
that, even if a foreign forum is hospitable to hearing the claims of
excluded foreign citizens, these citizens might not sue in that forum.
The failure to sue causes a loss to the foreign citizens who will not sue
(or at least will not recover as much) in an overseas forum. As we
previously described, the exclusion of foreign citizens can also result
in a loss in the value of the claims that remain in the American class
action. 133 Together, these two losses might be greater than the sav-
131 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. It is possible that the defendants
might rebut the presumption only as to a subset of the foreign claims; for instance, the
identified foreign forum might hear claims brought only by its own nationals.
132 Express consent is required and would likely take the form of a motion to inter-
vene. See FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a)-(b) (describing conditions under which intervention of
right and permissive intervention are permitted); cf id at 23(d) (1) (B) (iii), (C) (recogniz-
ing the possibility that class members will intervene). Declining to opt out of the class
action is an inadequate indicator of consent, given the reality of opt-out practice. Cf supra
note 87 (discussing the rarity of opting out). Instead, express consent is equivalent to an
opt-in process. A defendant could avoid the effect of a foreign citizen's consent by show-
ing that, in at least one hospitable foreign forum, the foreign citizen's express consent
would not bar relitigation.
133 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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ings from avoided relitigation. If so, the claims for which the costs of
exclusion are greater than their savings should be included in the
American class action.
Admittedly a court must strike this balance on less than perfect
information. But the American court can get some guidance by exam-
ining the nature of the foreign process. For instance, a critical issue is
whether the foreign forum employs a class-action-like approach in
which a class representative can press claims on behalf of others,1 34 or
whether the forum requires claimants to take affirmative, opt-in steps
to present their claims. If the latter, then the theoretical openness of
a forum in, say, Abu Dhabi means little to claimants from Britain; it is
unlikely that they will press their claims in such a distant forum. And
if they are not likely to press their claims, then the cost of their un-
dercompensation is weightier than the cost of their (unlikely) relitiga-
tion. Therefore, in applying this factor, it is important for a court to
be realistic about the likelihood that potentially excluded citizens will
pursue claims in the hospitable forum that the defendants have
identified.
In applying the two limits stated in the third step, a court might
be able to address inclusion and exclusion surgically. For instance, in
the example above, the court might choose to include British citizens
but exclude all citizens from Abu Dhabi other than the twenty who
expressly consented to be bound by the American class judgment or
settlement. Likewise, if the court already knows the value of the
American class judgment or settlement for certain foreign citizens (as,
for instance, with some settlement class actions), it might be able to
determine the likelihood of relitigation based on this recovery. In
other cases, however, the court might need to apply a flat rule, either
including or excluding all foreign citizens. The upshot of the third
step-especially step 3(b)-is that a court can apply whichever spe-
cific rule (inclusion rule, exclusion rule, Bersch-Vivendi rule, or incen-
tive rule) best accommodates the facts.
The fourth step establishes an opposite presumption of exclusion
for foreign citizens with large-stakes claims. The reason is again evi-
dent. If a case is regarded as large-stakes in an American court, it is
likely viable as an independent action in a foreign forum as well. Be-
cause these cases pose the greatest risk of relitigation, they are prime
candidates for exclusion. But there may be less here than meets the
eye. Although American courts have interpreted Rule 23 to allow
class treatment of small-stakes cases, they have been skeptical of class
134 If a class-action-like process were available, another relevant consideration would
be the duties of loyalty that this representative owes to the represented foreign citizens. If
the foreign process imposes no duty, then the risk of undercompensation (but not necessa-
rily underdeterrence) remains. See supra notes 37, 53 and accompanying text.
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treatment for claims that are independently viable. 135 Until this inter-
pretation changes, this presumption of exclusion operates only in the
rare circumstance when a set of large-stakes claims nonetheless passes
through the Rule 23 gauntlet.
The presumption can be overcome. As with small-stakes cases,
step 4(a) provides that a foreign citizen's consent to be bound is a
relevant reason to include the citizen in the class; and here, given the
stakes in the litigation, it is likely that some foreign citizens will have
enough interest in their claims to make their preference to be in-
cluded known to the American court. In such a situation, the attitude
of any identified nonrecognizing foreign forums toward such con-
sent-in particular, whether they will enforce the foreign citizen's
consent-determines the effect that the American court should give
to that consent.
The second circumstance under which the presumption can be
overcome (step 4(b)) is narrower than the comparable second cir-
cumstance for the opposite presumption (step 3(b)). A class repre-
sentative must show that none of the identified nonrecognizing
foreign forums is open to the foreign citizen. If any such forum is
open, the large stakes in the litigation provide an incentive for the
foreign citizen to pursue the case in this foreign forum. True, if they
had been allowed to participate in the American class action, the citi-
zens might have received more (or at least enough to eliminate the
incentive to relitigate), but the risk of relitigation, with its attendant
costs, is greatest in this area. A flat rule, rather than a rule allowing
the court to balance costs of undercompensation against costs of reliti-
gation, seems a more realistic way to limit costs in light of the parties'
litigation incentives.
The framework we propose is not costless. It is shaped around
the parties' incentives to sue and to relitigate and structured to be
administratively simple. Admittedly, it achieves neither objective per-
fectly. But, no rule in this area is costless, 136 and the "best" rule in
theory is impossible to administer in practice. 137 The framework bal-
ances the plaintiffs' interest in adequate compensation, the defend-
ants' interest in finality, the American courts' interest in
adminstrability, and the shared international interest in appropriate
deterrence.
135 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (3) (A) (stating that a relevant factor in determining certifi-
cation of opt-out class actions is "the class members' interests in individually controlling
the prosecution or defense of separate actions"); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734,
748 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing the certification of a mass tort in part because the claims
were individually viable); supra note 32 and accompanying text.
136 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
137 See supra Part V.C.
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CONCLUSION
One of strengths of the Bersch-Vivendi consensus is its appeal to a
rough sense of justice: foreign citizens ought not to be able to take
advantage of membership in an American class action if they can walk
away from an unfavorable result and sue again in their home coun-
try.'13 But this rough sense of justice frustrates the delivery of com-
pensation to deserving victims and fails to deter defendants
adequately. Moreover, it is only partially successful in preventing the
relitigation that it was designed to avoid. Rough senses of justice are
usually just that-rough. A more refined sense of justice should now
prevail. The Bersch-Vivendi consensus imposes significant costs-costs
that can usually be avoided or reduced with a framework of rules
more sensitive to the parties' incentives to litigate. If delivering com-
pensation fairly and efficiently to class members and deterring wrong-
ful behavior are the ultimate goals of class actions, the time to replace
the Bersch-Vivendi rule is now.
138 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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